

The Saskatchewan CCF government and treaty Indians, 1944-64

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ABSTRACT (ABSTRACT)

Indian policy making in Canada is examined, with a focus on CCF rule in Saskatchewan from 1944 to 1964. On examination, the Saskatchewan policy shows a remarkable congruity with the basic principles of the "Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969," which is now seen as a symbol of the government's insensitivity and ineptitude in the field of Indian policy.

FULL TEXT

THE Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969, better known as the white paper, has acquired near - legendary status as a symbol of Canadian government insensitivity and ineptitude in the field of Indian policy. Supposedly written in consultation with Indian groups, the document's most notable effect was to unite Indians in opposition to it. The paper has been characterized as 'the capstone of a policy of assimilation that can be traced back to the pre -Confederation years.'(f.1) It recommended abolition of Indian status, repeal of the Indian Act, elimination of the Indian Affairs department, transfer of reserves to the control of Indian people (land would no longer be held in trust for Indians by the crown), and delivery of services to Indians through the same channels and from the same government agencies as were used for other Canadians. The ultimate goal was the termination of the treaties: 'once Indian lands are securely within Indian control, the anomaly of treaties between groups within society and the government of that society will require that these treaties be reviewed to see how they can be equitably ended.'(f.2)

Many writers have drawn attention to the liberal political philosophy underlying the white paper.(f.3) Liberalism holds that what people have in common is ultimately more important than what separates them, 'that persons are essentially the same, intrinsically valuable and capable of rational action when assured of the conditions of freedom and equality.'(f.4) As a system of thought, it allows little room for group rights, particularly when legal protection for special rights granted on the basis of racial or ethnic criteria override individual rights. The affirmation of the equality of individual rights and the denial of special status and group rights pervade the white paper. The foundations of Indian communal existence, whether historical, treaty -based, or arising from Aboriginal rights, are blasted away by the unrelenting logic of liberal, individualist ideology.

Scholars have detected Pierre Trudeau in the white paper, suggesting that the prime minister was 'a potent force in the formation of Indian policy'(f.5) and the 'single greatest influence' shaping it.(f.6) Trudeau 'perceived the body politic as composed of individuals who related to their governments as atoms or isolated entities rather than as members of ethnic, racial, class, or regional entities.'(f.7) His views were reinforced by his ongoing struggle against Quebec nationalists who were seeking recognition of special status and collective rights, a struggle that engaged him fully and accounted for his entry into politics in the first place.(f.8)

Liberal ideas were not the sole property of Pierre Trudeau. They had currency in the Liberal government, the Liberal

party, and among citizens at large,(f.9) and they presumably influenced Indian policy making, not only in Ottawa but also in the provincial governments. Sally M. Weaver, in her detailed study of the development of the white paper, makes only passing reference to the provinces, observing that during the 1960s the federal government discussed the transfer of services on a 'function by function' basis to the provinces, but the latter, by and large, continued to argue that Indians were a federal responsibility.(f.10)

This essay shifts the focus from Ottawa to the provincial level, analysing CCF rule in Saskatchewan from 1944 to 1964. Saskatchewan, for various reasons, is a good candidate for study. It had, according to the 1961 census, the highest proportion of people of Indian ancestry compared with the total population of any province in the country.(f.11) Both Premiers T.C. Douglas (1944-61)(f.12) and Woodrow Lloyd (1961-4)(f.13) had a strong personal interest in Indian welfare, and the CCF as a party was committed to improving the lot of disadvantaged groups. The result of this combination of circumstances was a high level of activity in the field of Indian policy making.

Examination of Saskatchewan policy reveals a remarkable congruity with the basic principles of the 1969 white paper. The conceptualizing of the 'Indian dilemma' and the prescription of remedies were virtually identical. Both the CCF government and the white paper argued that 'equality' or 'non - discrimination' was the key to solving Indian problems. Equality of individual rights was to be achieved by eliminating special status, dismantling the Indian Affairs department, and transferring to the provinces responsibility for administering services to Indians.(f.14) Although Saskatchewan CCF policy was not quite as harsh as the white paper in that it did not recommend repeal of the Indian Act or termination of the treaties in the near future, it shared the long - term goal of treating Indians the same way as all other Canadians are treated. Seen from this perspective,the white paper was not a Trudeauite aberration, but rather was firmly grounded in the 'progressive' opinion of the previous decades.

The notion that Indians should constitute a distinct, self - governing entity separate from the rest of the population was completely alien to the Saskatchewan CCF. As Douglas told the Regina Welfare Council in 1959, 'Reservations are becoming insufficient to hold the increasing Indian population. The solution is for the Indians to integrate into white society.'(f.15) 'Integration' differed only slightly from 'assimilation' in that the former, while demanding conformity to the values of the dominant culture, tolerated vestigial ethnic traditions. The integrationist approach led to three specific initiatives: the granting of the provincial franchise to Indians, extension of equal liquor rights, and the effort to have responsibility for Indian affairs transferred from federal to provincial jurisdiction. They were all based on the principle that citizens in a democracy should be treated equally and should relate to government institutions in the same way.

During the period from 1944 to 1964, Indian issues were from time to time the subject of debate in the Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly. Douglas set the tone in March 1946 when he characterized the treatment of Aboriginal people as 'one of the blackest pages' in Canadian history.(f.16) Numerous other CCF speeches elaborated on the theme of the white man's guilt.(f.17) W.J. Berezowsky (CCF - Cumberland) presented an idyllic picture of Indian life before agricultural settlement: 'The buffalo were plentiful, the deer were many as were the animals such as the fur - bearers which provided the peltries which native people could trade to the Hudson's Bay Company and the Northwest Company ... In some way, I would submit that these people had a happy life which gave them a certain amount of satisfaction.'(f.18) Contact with Western civilization had brought catastrophe: 'I can never forget that one of the greatest injuries ever done to any race ... was done here in America ... They [Aboriginal people] lost everything that they had been proud of; not only their country, but they have lost their souls, their culture and their way of life.'(f.19) Arnold Feusi (CCF - Pelly) echoed this interpretation, asserting that pre - contact Plains Indians were a proud and decent people before they had been 'corrupted by the habits of probably our lesser whites.'(f.20) Robert Wooff (CCF - Turtleford) argued that not only had Indians been exploited in the past, but their

exploitation as cheap labour had continued to the present day.(f.21)

Accompanying this understanding of Indian - white relations was an indictment of deplorable living conditions. MLAs discussed at length the inadequate housing, inferior furnishings, lack of electricity, telephones, or modern amenities, inferior schooling, absence of job opportunities, low incomes, and high death rates of Indian people. The Indian Affairs branch was repeatedly blamed for this state of affairs. It was sarcastically observed that the only decent living quarters on a reserve typically belonged to the Indian agent, who was often stigmatized as a heeler more devoted to his political masters than to the Indians.(f.22) These comments had a partisan tinge since the Liberal party, which formed the official opposition in Saskatchewan, controlled the government in Ottawa. Opposition MLAs had a different opinion about the performance of the Indian Affairs branch. Reeling off facts from Indian department annual reports, they spoke glowingly of Indian educational and health services (all of it 'completely free') and applauded the pace of house construction on reserves.(f.23) Some went so far as to challenge the CCF thesis that Indians were disadvantaged. H.C. Dunfield (Liberal - Meadow Lake) remarked that Indians in his area were the envy of their white neighbours: 'I know that many farmers around Meadow Lake look very longingly at that beautiful reserve. They have absolute security of tenure; they have no taxes whatever to pay; their medical and hospitalization is taken care of by the Federal government; their entire educational costs are taken care of.' Clinching the argument, he told the story of his visit to Beauval school where he witnessed with amazement Indian children adroitly solving arithmetic problems, a sure sign, he claimed, of the rapid progress Aboriginal people were making.(f.24)

Where the CCF saw poverty and oppression, the Liberals discerned prosperity and privilege. Where the CCF condemned irresponsibility and neglect in Indian administration, the Liberals admired wise expenditures and progressive programs. The divergent perceptions stemmed partly from partisan politics - the CCF trying to blacken the Liberals and the Liberals defending their Ottawa colleagues - and partly from political philosophy. The CCF considered as part of its *raison d'être* the championing of underprivileged minorities. This was the gist of Douglas's 1946 speech: 'It has been said that the measure of any society is what it does for the least fortunate group ... It is not enough to establish a cooperative commonwealth and to raise the standard of living if there continues to remain like a canker a small, underprivileged, diseased, illiterate minority in society.'(f.25) J.H. Sturdy, the provincial minister responsible for Indian and Metis issues from 1956 to 1960, declared that the CCF government could not be true to its motto of 'Humanity First' unless it tried to help the Indian population.(f.26) Thus, during this period, the CCF were more attuned to the plight of Aboriginals than were the Liberals.

To recognize a problem was one thing; to find a solution quite another. The dominant motif in CCF speeches was the identification of 'segregation' as the problem and 'integration' as the solution. The word 'segregation' triggered emotions and encoded revulsion to injustice. At the most literal level, it referred to the physical isolation of Indian reserve communities. In 1946, with images of the holocaust still fresh, D.M. Lozorko (CCF - Redberry) compared reservations to concentration camps: 'We are overlooking a parallel situation here when we have voluntary concentration camps in which the Indian sits quietly and stoically watches the extinction of his race.'(f.27) Near the end of the Korean War, W.H. Wahl (CCF - Qu'Appelle) speculated that when the Indian veterans returned home, they must have been confused 'because they had noticed in Korea the elaborate barbed - wire fences and machine gun nests that they had used to keep the prisoners that they had taken in custody, and when they got back here they found out that they were kept in custody on the Indian Reserve - not behind barbed - wire fences or machine guns, but for economic and for social reasons.'(f.28) The Cold War inspired another metaphor - the Indian reserve as a combination Soviet collective farm and slave labour camp:

A very popular picture magazine that has a wide circulation on the North American continent, had pictures of the farms in Russia and the farm homes and their surroundings, and I noticed that these surroundings were very drab.

They were mud one - storey shacks, and the things that you would notice around them were old - fashioned carts and things of that nature, and the people in these pictures had a very depressed look on their faces; you could see that they were not entirely happy ... I noticed it said that these people were always in constant fear of being taken away to slave labour camps. If they happened to do anything that would displease the Russian government, they were apt to be taken there. And it said if they entered these slave labour camps they were given a number, and that when the food or the grain or whatever they produced, grain or cattle, was divided, it was done under the supervision of a police chief ... But when I went on the Indian Reserves I commenced to think of this, and I noticed the Indians lived in the same shacks, only worse, and their surroundings were not as good. They could not even compare with these houses in the dictatorship of Russia. There was another thing. I have stated that the Russian got a number when he went to the slave labour camp; but the Indians on our reserves here in Saskatchewan and Canada, also have a number. They are known to the Federal Government by a number and not by a name.(f.29)

The likening of reserves to concentration camps, prisoner - of - war camps, and the gulag indicated the strong feelings surrounding the issue. Far from regarding reserves as a land base for Indian nations, CCF MLAs derided them as places of physical deprivation and spiritual enslavement, the Canadian equivalent of apartheid in South Africa.(f.30) The other obvious international comparison was the southern United States, where, by the early 1960s, the civil rights movement was filling the news media. Peter Gzowski brought the story home in a 1963 Maclean's article, 'This Is Our Alabama,' which mordantly described red - neck race prejudice and violence in Saskatchewan.(f.31) Members of the CCF caucus identified closely with the Afro - American struggle for equality. When a white Unitarian minister from Boston was beaten to death in Selma, Alabama, in 1965, the CCF caucus sent his widow a letter of condolence together with a small sum of money they had personally contributed.(f.32) Later, after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr, a letter and donation were sent to Mrs King. Woodrow Lloyd expressed the solidarity of CCFers with the principles of the civil rights movement, informing the martyred leader's widow that the CCF government in Saskatchewan had introduced the first Bill of Rights in Canada as well as legislation in the field of fair employment and fair accommodation practices.(f.33) The civil rights movement was grounded in the liberal ideal of all human beings having been created equal and endowed with inalienable rights. It made 'segregation' a byword for evil, and 'integration' a synonym for justice, a vocabulary readily adopted by CCF MLAs because it suited their understanding of the Indian situation. The appeal was to universal rights and equality of citizenship, not to cultural distinctiveness or separate identity.

When CCF MLAs used the term 'segregation' in relation to Indians, they had more in mind than the geographical isolation of reserves. They referred also to legal disabilities differentiating Indians from other citizens. Indians did not have the right to vote or consume liquor. They were not allowed to sell moveable assets, including grain, without the written consent of the Indian superintendent. They couldn't have a will probated if it was deemed 'not in the public interest.' They were denied the right to appeal to ordinary courts decisions of the minister acting under the terms of the Indian Act. Band councils had little effective control over the expenditure of band funds. In short, the law relegated Indians to the status of second - rate citizens.(f.34)

Apart from legal barriers, there were informal and invisible impediments to full Indian participation in the benefits of Canadian life. W.J. Berezowsky, who represented a northern constituency, told the story of the bank manager from southern Saskatchewan who went fishing up north and got along famously with his Indian guide. When the Indian visited the city and walked into a hotel, he was told, 'Sorry, we are filled up.' When he went to see his bank manager friend, he was informed by the secretary, 'I am sorry, the boss is away, or he is busy.(f.35) Berezowsky's point was that Indians were not only segregated in the sense of being denied access to jobs and economic opportunities, but, psychologically more devastating, were robbed of self - respect and dignity. The material loss was secondary to the spiritual loss. Berezowsky said that as a Ukrainian immigrant who had experienced discrimination, he felt he had some understanding of the sting of racism, but he looked forward to the day when

elected Aboriginal person could explain what prejudice really meant.(f.36)

Yet another dimension of segregation was the discrepancy between the educational, health, and social welfare services delivered to citizens at large by the provincial government and the services delivered to Indians by the federal government. In almost every respect, Indians received inferior treatment. In 1954 and again in 1956, Berezowsky introduced private member's resolutions, both of which passed unanimously, calling for the upgrading of Indian services 'on a basis of equality with the services in those fields now provided for Saskatchewan citizens generally, and without abrogation or loss of their hereditary or treaty rights.'(f.37) This would require federal - provincial negotiations, since the BNA Act gave the federal government responsibility for Indians. Berezowsky's motion in 1956 also asked the provincial government to consider extending the franchise and repealing all discriminatory legislation.

Equality of rights was the key to the government's integrationist policy. The difference between 'integration' and 'assimilation' was a subtle one. During the early 1950s, 'assimilation' had been the term of choice, but it gradually gave way to the more politically correct 'integration.' In 1954, for example, Feusi had unapologetically declared, 'It is very necessary, Mr. Speaker, that we assimilate our Indians at an early date,'(f.38) and J.H. Sturdy (CCF - Saskatoon) added, 'Until the Indian becomes assimilated with our society and part of it, occupying an important and dignified position in our society, we are going to have these Metis problems with us.'(f.39) By the later 1950s CCF MLAs were shying away from 'assimilation.' Berezowsky, who had contended in 1954 that 'the answer to the problem was assimilation,'(f.40) abandoned the term in 1956 when he avowed, 'I am not going to suggest that this problem can be solved by assimilation ... it is more a problem, I think, of integration in Canadian society ... and by integration I mean that we would treat them as a minority, just as other minorities are being treated in Canada today.'(f.41)

Some MLAs spoke sympathetically of what they regarded as the positive features of Indian civilization. Eldon Johnson (CCF - Kerrobert - Kindersley) began a speech in 1961 by holding up a spearpoint discovered on the plains and reminding his listeners that they were newcomers to a land that had been the ancestral home of Indians for millennia. He went on to propose the employment of a provincial archaeologist to preserve as much as possible of the artifacts of Indian civilization.(f.42) Berezowsky spoke in praise of traditional Indian ways: 'we should take actions to preserve all the good in Indian culture and in Indian skills, which today I know are dormant to a very great extent ... just as we have safeguarded those values of the various ethnic origins that came to this country.'(f.43) However, other CCF leaders saw little worth preserving in Indian culture. Thus, Sturdy declared in March 1957: 'Throughout the world, Mr. Speaker, minority groups in time die out or are forced to conform to the standards and behaviour of the majority population, and that we refer to as integration.'(f.44) At best, therefore, integration meant tolerance for minor ethnic particularities; at worst, it was indistinguishable from assimilation.

The integrationist policy began to take shape in the provincial bureaucracy in the spring of 1956 when the cabinet established a Committee on Indian Affairs chaired by Sturdy, minister without portfolio and assistant to the premier. Other than what he might have learned as manager of a Sioux hockey team when he was principal of Fort Qu'Appelle High School, he had no special knowledge of Indians, but because he was not responsible for a government department, he was in a position to handle a subject with many interdepartmental ramifications.(f.45) The committee's report in November 1956 became the government's general Indian policy. Based on the principle of integration and following the thrust of Berezowsky's private member's motions, it included three specific proposals: extension of the provincial franchise, removal of restrictions on the sale of liquor to Indians, and the transfer of responsibility for Indian affairs from the federal to the provincial government. The report noted that the first item could be accomplished simply by striking out the clause in the Saskatchewan Election Act that prohibited Indians, except for veterans and their spouses, from voting. Before recommending this change, the

committee examined carefully the political implications for the CCF. They assumed that most Indians would vote Liberal because of the influence of Indian agents, who tended to be of that party stripe. However, analysis showed that even if Indians did vote Liberal, the CCF would not lose many seats. Projecting the Indian vote on the results of the 1956 provincial election, and assuming 60 per cent Indian support for the Liberals, 30 per cent for the CCF, and 10 per cent for Social Credit, only one CCF seat, Athabaska, would have fallen to the Liberals. If 80 per cent of Indians had voted Liberal, Athabaska would still be the only seat lost. By these calculations, the CCF could give the vote to Indians without doing themselves undue harm.

The committee's second recommendation was the granting of liquor rights. The Indian Act prohibited the sale of liquor to Indians and forbade Indians from having liquor in their possession. However, amendments to the Indian Act in 1951 and 1956 enabled the provincial government to ask the federal government to allow Indians to patronize drinking establishments and to purchase intoxicants for consumption off the reserve. The procedure to be followed was a formal request from the provincial lieutenant - governor - in - council, leading to a proclamation by the federal governor - in - council. To authorize the use of liquor on a reserve, an additional step was required. A referendum had to be held in which the majority of band members on a given reserve signified their approval. The Committee on Indian Affairs anticipated no serious problems with Indians drinking in licensed premises, but predicted difficulties if they could not take liquor they had purchased on to the reserve. Prevented from having liquor in their homes, they would be tempted to break the law by drinking in the streets or in alleys. Because of this complication, the committee advised caution.

The franchise and liquor rights were associated with a third idea -provincial jurisdiction over Indian affairs. According to the committee's logic, equality of citizenship demanded both elimination of legal distinctions and uniformity in the ways citizens related to the government. The federal government, therefore, should give up its wardship of Indians and enable them to receive education, health, social welfare, and other government services through the same channels as did the other residents of the province.(f.46) This last recommendation, involving a major restructuring of administration and the destruction of the trust relationship between Indians and the Government of Canada, proved the most difficult to implement.

Action on the vote and liquor rights was easier, particularly since some Indians supported the measures. Debate on the franchise centred on whether treaty rights were endangered. Among those who perceived no threat was Dan Kennedy (Ochankugahe), a well - educated and prosperous farmer from the Assiniboine reserve south of Sinaluta. He valued the vote as a democratic right and symbol of equality. Invited in 1947 to address the banquet marking the opening of the session of the Saskatchewan legislature, he used the occasion to appeal for the franchise, 'thereby restoring to the native Canadian dignity of manhood and pride of race.'(f.47) Anticipating the controversy this view would spark, Kennedy tried to persuade the Regina Leader - Post not to publish the statement.(f.48) The newspaper printed the story anyway, prompting two councillors on the Assiniboine reserve, Charles Ryder, Sr, and D. Saultaux, to buy advertisements in the Leader - Post and on Regina CKCK radio, declaring that they did not want the vote forced upon them: 'We have our treaty and we want to keep our rights and freedom.'(f.49)

Part of the controversy arose from confusion over the terms 'enfranchisement' and 'franchise.' 'Enfranchisement' was a term used in the Indian Act to describe the legal process whereby an Indian renounced his Indian status, gained the vote, moved irrevocably off the reserve, and became liable to pay taxes just like any other citizen. Since enfranchisement meant the loss of identity as well as material losses, very few Indians voluntarily agreed to it. When white politicians began talking about the franchise, fears of enfranchisement were inevitably aroused. There was another twist to the verbal tangle. A clause of the Indian Act allowed an Indian the franchise without forfeiting Indian status providing he waived his tax exemption for income earned on the reserve.(f.50) In other words, the law linked the concepts of voting and paying taxes, and Indians logically assumed that accepting one would

automatically lead to the other. The linkage was evident in a letter to Douglas from Angus Mirasty and William B. Charles, who quoted words of John Diefenbaker spoken at a meeting of band chiefs at Duck Lake: 'My friends you Indian people I want this day to give you a stiff warning, as soon as you go and vote alongside of the white man and white man sees that you get the same equal rights as the many that pay taxes, they the white people are going to turn around to the Government to charge you Indians to pay for through roads before you Indians can haul your grains.'(f.51)

Despite such indications of anti-franchise opinion, the government went ahead with plans for a conference of Saskatchewan Indians in the fall of 1958. William Wuttunee, a lawyer employed by Saskatchewan Government Insurance and the only Indian member of the provincial Committee on Indian Affairs, toured a number of reserves, sounding opinion and trying to allay concerns. He reported that John Tootoosis, a Cree from Poundmaker reserve who had been active in Indian political organizations since the 1920s, viewed the franchise as 'the thin edge of the wedge' leading to the destruction of treaty rights.'(f.52) Tootoosis's opinion carried weight, and, from the provincial government's point of view, his opposition was a serious matter.

One hundred and three chiefs and councillors attended the conference which opened on 30 October 1958 at Valley Centre, Fort Qu'Appelle.(f.53) Douglas, in his keynote address, emphasized repeatedly that voting and liquor rights would not impair treaty rights: 'I want to begin by saying that I believe the central strong point of the Indian life in Saskatchewan and in Canada lies in the treaties which you have with the Great White Queen. Nothing which we are suggesting to you is intended to weaken those treaties ... They were signed in good faith. They are to last as long as the sun shines and the rivers flow.'(f.54) Douglas also promised not to grant the vote or liquor rights without first obtaining the consent of Indians.(f.55)

The government had lined up distinguished speakers including Senator James Gladstone, a leading figure in the Indian Association of Alberta, Albert E. Thompson, founder of the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood, and Frank Calder, an Indian who had been elected to the British Columbia legislature. Despite their testimony in support of the vote and liquor rights, many delegates were unconvinced. Sensing the lack of consensus, Tootoosis made a decisive intervention, reminding the chiefs and councillors: 'You haven't held meetings on your reserves to ask your people what they think of all this and where you should stand on this issue. They're the ones that are going to be affected by it and probably be destroyed along with their children through liquor. I wonder what will happen to you when you get home and the people find out that you agreed to allow liquor on your reserve. A lot of them are afraid of liquor and what it could do to them if it was allowed. Same with voting rights, this has been rejected by the people for a long time.'(f.56) Tootoosis moved that the conference not take a decision one way or the other and that the issues be revisited at another conference to be held the following year.(f.57) The motion carried by a large majority. Tootoosis did not specifically say that he was unalterably opposed to the vote and liquor rights; he merely advised more consultation. Indeed, he hinted that he was trying to save Douglas from a mistake: 'This way [by deferring a decision to another conference] you will avoid confrontation and the leader here ('Okimow' probably meaning the Premier) [translator's note] will also be in a better position for such a move. The way he is trying to go about it here, a lot of people will be against him, he'll soon find out at the next election that he had displeased so many people.'(f.58)

The government had unquestionably suffered a setback, and it reacted by adopting a more consultative style. It resolved to work with Indians to sell the idea of equal rights, rather than simply staging a conference and expecting everyone to fall in line. To this end, an Advisory Committee, composed of one Indian from each of the nine agencies in the province, was set up to help plan the next conference as well as to consult with and do educational work on the reserves. The government agreed to pay the Indian Advisory Committee \$1000 to cover transportation expenses.(f.59) It is important to note that the committee doubled as the acting executive of the

newly formed Federation of Saskatchewan Indians (FSI), since another outcome of the 1958 conference was the formation of a unified organization for Indians in the province. By unanimous vote, supporters of John Tootoosis, president of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians, and of William Joseph, president of the Queen Victoria Protective Association, had agreed to join forces. The \$1000 grant marked the beginning of provincial government financial support for the FSI.

The second government - sponsored conference took place at Fort Qu'Appelle on 20 and 21 October 1959. As at the first conference, there was no consensus for accepting the vote and liquor rights. Consequently, the government manoeuvred to place the following motion before the delegates: 'Whereas in a political democracy the vote is a right and not a privilege, and whereas some Indians want the provincial vote and others do not want the vote, therefore be it resolved that the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians in conference assembled be not required to petition the Provincial Government on this question.'(f.60) The motion was almost unanimously rejected, leaving the provincial government in a quandary. Douglas had made a commitment not to introduce franchise and liquor legislation without Indian consent, but two provincial conferences had failed to secure that consent.

Another element now entered provincial policy making. In 1960 Jack Sturdy retired and the chairmanship of the Committee on Indian Affairs, which had been renamed the Provincial Committee on Minority Groups,(f.61) passed to Douglas. Concurrently, a staff person with the title of executive director was attached to the committee, the first provincial- bureaucrat to deal virtually full time with Aboriginal issues. Appointed to the post was Ray H. Woollam, a former United Church minister with devoutly progressive political leanings.(f.62) He had easy access to Premiers Douglas and Lloyd, to both of whom he addressed long, uninhibited, and frankly partisan memoranda. After the CCF government was defeated in 1964, these documents caused embarrassment when copies were found in a secretary's wastebasket and handed over to Liberal ministers who freely and delightedly quoted them.(f.63)

As executive director of the Provincial Committee on Minority Groups, Woollam uncompromisingly supported the principle of equal rights. Pressing the buttons of CCF guilt, he lobbied Douglas to grant the vote and liquor rights to Indians: 'It seems a further pity to me that the only Canadian province with legislation respecting Human Rights should be so hesitant on this front.'(f.64) Woollam also supplied practical arguments. Provincial government action would ease the tension and conflict among the members of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians who were divided over the proposed changes. In addition, fears about impaired treaty rights were subsiding now that Indians were voting without apparent harm to themselves in Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia. Even the government of Canada, with whom the treaties were signed, was on the brink of granting the franchise.

Judging from the resolutions passed at provincial CCF conventions, the party rank and file supported the vote for Indians. A CCF Provincial Council meeting in late 1959 debated the issue, with heated opposition coming from MLAs who were worried about losing their seats because of the reserve vote. Although Douglas personally opposed the pro - franchise motion, it passed, and he agreed to abide by the will of the majority.(f.65) Announcing the decision in the legislature on 11 March 1960, he confessed that he was breaking his promise not to proceed without Indian approval. He gave three reasons for the volte - face: voting would not jeopardize treaty rights, politicians were more apt to listen to Indians if they were voters, and, according to Douglas, many young Indians said they wanted the vote.(f.66) Douglas's decision brought congratulations from Dan Kennedy: 'Please convey my thanks to your colleagues for their good faith in the brotherhood of man. Without this instrument of defence [the vote] the Indian is a maverick in his own country - as you once aptly expressed it - "like a stray dog, unwanted and kicked about and that the politicians had no time for him.."'(f.67) Douglas replied that he hoped the resentments caused by his granting the vote without Indian permission and the fears about the loss of treaty rights would eventually dissipate.(f.68)

Chief William Joseph of the Big White Fish reserve, former president of the Queen Victoria Protective Association, remained unappeased. He made speeches and collected money through the Meadow Lake and Loon Lake areas to pay for a protest trip to Ottawa, and he exhorted Indians in Cree on a Prince Albert radio station not to participate in the coming provincial election.(f.69) Woollam countered by obtaining air time for pro - vote messages.(f.70)

In the view of the government, the right to vote was tied to equal liquor rights. As early as 1946 J.L. Phelps, minister of natural resources, asked, 'If we are going to have whiskey and beer for white people, why not for Indians?' He maintained that Indians in the Canadian armed forces during the war had proved they could handle liquor as well as anybody else.(f.71) At the end of the Korean War, Wahl made the same argument, pointing to the hypocrisy of praising Indian veterans for defending democracy while banning them from beer parlours.(f.72) Opponents of liberalized liquor laws, like Kennedy, warned of social breakdown caused by that 'demoralizing agent - the firewater.'(f.73) On the other hand, it was argued that when Indians were not allowed to consume alcoholic beverages legally, they did so illegally, often paying extortionate prices for the 'poison' supplied by bootleggers.(f.74)

Woollam took the purist position that no discrimination of any kind on the basis of race should be tolerated. Equal liquor rights and the vote were 'symbols of freedom.' In a memo to Sturdy, he cited an incident that had occurred at a meeting of the Northern Fisherman's Cooperative in Prince Albert in March 1960. A white female government employee, sitting with several Indians over a beer in the Marlborough Hotel, was approached by a policeman who wanted to know if her companions were treaty Indians. Since treaty Indians were not allowed in an establishment that served alcoholic beverages, she lied and said the Indians were all enfranchised. Woollam also referred to conversations he had had with government employees at La Ronge. They told him that liquor laws were a barrier to integration because whites could not invite Indians to bridge parties, community meetings, and other social events where liquor was often served.(f.75)

These arguments prevailed as they were bound to, since the CCF government regarded equal rights as central to their integrationist policy. Soon after granting the franchise, the province formally requested the federal government to issue a proclamation allowing Indians to patronize bars and purchase alcoholic beverages at liquor board stores. Indians voted for the first time in a provincial election on 8 June 1960; the federal proclamation giving them liquor rights came into effect on 27 July 1960.(f.76)

Woollam sensed a 'general good feeling' among Indians concerning both the franchise and the liquor rights. He informed Douglas that the atmosphere at the FSI annual conference in October 1960 was improved because the anxiety caused by the pressure to come to a decision on these matters had been removed and delegates were now able to consider solutions to a variety of other pressing problems.(f.77) Woollam's impressions of Indian reaction may have been tinged by wishful thinking or the desire to have his own policy recommendations vindicated. His assessment was at variance with that of John Tootoosis, who emphasized the fact that the government had imposed its will on the Indians. He saw something sinister in the association of the vote with liquor:

Getting back to the voting issue - the people didn't want the vote. It was Diefenbaker who shoved the federal vote down Indian throats - he never asked them whether they wanted it or not, he just gave them the federal vote. Later on Tommy Douglas did the same thing - he also went ahead and gave drinking privileges ... This is why Indians never voted much during elections, it wasn't their consent to have the vote - it was just given to them. One could also say that they were literally shoved into a pool of liquor. The reason why they gave the vote to the Indians was only for the number of votes they could get from them and of course to use liquor along with it. For example, if I were on the side of Diefenbaker I would say to him if you give liquor to the Indians I'll get votes on your side - that's

how they were going to use these things. That was the same with Tommy Douglas.(f.78)

Although Tootoosis correctly observed that Indians had not consented to either the vote or the liquor rights, it is also true that they made no concerted effort to have the measures revoked. Indeed, according to Woollam, some Indian leaders encouraged their people to vote in the 1960 election.(f.79) The evidence supports Tootoosis's allegation that many non - Indian politicians were motivated by narrow partisan interests. The CCF Indian Affairs Committee had calculated the impact of the Indian vote on party fortunes, and CCF MLAs with reserves in their constituencies had opposed extension of the franchise. With respect to ending discriminatory liquor laws, Woollam expressed concern that the Liberals would move first. He noted that a Liberal candidate was pitching liquor rights as his first platform plank to Indians: 'It would be too bad if we were pushed into action.'(f.80) Woollam was also aware of the dangers of electoral bribery, and, after the election, he heard numerous complaints of vote - buying with cash and liquor.(f.81) All this being said, non - Indian politicians were not driven solely by vote - mongering. The CCF had a broader agenda leading to what they claimed would be a 'solution' to Indian poverty and disadvantaged status. The vote and liquor rights were merely steps towards the larger goal of integration.

Another more significant step was the transfer of jurisdiction over Indian affairs from the federal to the provincial government. The Committee on Indian Affairs report to cabinet in 1956 had recommended the transfer, and Sturdy elaborated on the idea in a speech in the legislature in 1957. He argued that the Ottawa bureaucracy was located too far away from the reserves to deal effectively with Indian problems. More importantly, the existence of a separate government department for Indians entrenched segregation and thwarted the merging of Indian people into mainstream society. He considered the distinction between status Indians and Metis artificial and costly since it led to duplication of programs and facilities. The province, he claimed, could not come to grips with the problems of Metis communities without also assisting the Indians who lived on adjacent reserves.(f.82)

Provincial government action was to be initiated by a major research project to gather data about the economy, society, and culture of Saskatchewan Indians, on the basis of which long - term plans for their guided development could be prepared. The Committee on Indian Affairs submitted a proposal to President W.P. Thompson of the University of Saskatchewan, who agreed in principle, but said nothing could be done until the university hired a chairperson for the sociology department. In the meantime, Sturdy obtained a commitment from J.W. Pickersgill, the federal minister responsible for Indian affairs, to share the cost of the research. With the defeat of the federal Liberal government in 1957, negotiations had to begin all over again. Prospects looked bright when E. Davie Fulton, the new federal minister, gave his approval and when the university hired a sociologist, but then Diefenbaker decided to appoint a joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian affairs. The Saskatchewan government was told that its research project would not be considered until the joint committee had completed its work.(f.83)

The province submitted to the joint committee a lengthy, thoroughly researched brief written by the Economic Advisory Planning Board and the various government departments involved with Indians under the supervision of the Provincial Committee on Minority Groups. The brief pointed out that Saskatchewan's Indian population in 1960 was 23,000 and increasing at a rapid rate. On - reserve population grew 9 per cent between 1941 and 1946, 15 per cent between 1946 and 1951, 18 per cent between 1951 and 1956, and 21 per cent between 1956 and 1959.(f.84) Movement of people away from reserves was also increasing (from 1 per cent of the total in 1942 to 3.7 per cent in 1957), but not enough to mitigate the rise in on - reserve population.(f.85) Population pressures and limited resources resulted in a low standard of living. In 1958 the average per capita personal income for all the people in Saskatchewan was estimated at \$1245, whereas the average per capita income for Indians in the province was only \$208.(f.86) Reserves were 'becoming more and more mere domiciliary areas for the convenient distribution of whatever relief paternalistic governments may care to hand out.'(f.87) While agreeing that the economic potential

of reserves should be fully developed, the brief concluded that the long - term solution lay in facilitating the movement of Indians off the reserves into urban employment.

According to the government of Saskatchewan, the main reason Indians did not share equitably in the advantages of Canadian life was that they had been stifled by the administrative system imposed on them. Legal disabilities and ward status were not conducive to the development of Indian self - determination and the ability to compete with other Canadians. In addition, the system discouraged Indians from leaving the reserves where they enjoyed a degree of security, however minimal, to risk the insecurities of life off the reserve.(f.88) For example, the Indian Affairs branch provided health services for Indians living on reserves and for those who lived off - reserve for less than one year. After the one - year period had elapsed, Indians had to provide for their own needs, or, if indigent, become the responsibility of the municipalities where they lived. Similarly with social welfare payments, on - reserve Indians received federal aid, but poor Indians living off the reserve had to appeal to the municipal authorities who were usually reluctant to place them on the welfare roll and attempted to persuade them to go back to the reserves. The brief argued that if health and welfare services were delivered by the province both on and off the reserves, then the barriers to off - reserve migration would become less formidable. However, the provincial government qualified these proposals with the rider that it did not want to bear full financial responsibility. Ottawa must continue to pay until Indians were self - supporting and integrated into the provincial economy.

The brief posited education as the key to integration. It opposed residential schools and advocated integrated schools because they 'break down their [Indian children's] feeling of being different and prepare them for competition with non - Indians in their adult life by making better known to them the attitudes and morals of the dominant society.'(f.89) In a revealing comparison, the brief quoted the decision of the United States Supreme Court on the segregation of school children to the effect that 'separate' cannot be 'equal' in education.(f.90) Just as Afro - Americans were to be integrated in American society rather than constituting a separate nation, Saskatchewan Indians were destined to lose their separateness as a collectivity and become absorbed into Canadian society.

The submission to the Joint Committee in 1960 was backed up the following year by a unanimous resolution of the Saskatchewan legislature 'that this Assembly urges the Government of Canada to enact legislation which will make it possible for a province to assume complete administration of Indian Affairs when such decentralization is requested by a province and by a majority of the Treaty Indians in that province.'(f.91) Douglas described this proposal as 'the ultimate solution.' With respect to finances, he suggested a twenty - five - year transitional period during which federal aid would ratchet downward until it fell to zero. Douglas expected that, at the end of the period, Indians would be self - supporting taxpayers.(f.92)

The Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs completed its report in 1961 and recommended, among other things, that 'Indian Affairs should be the subject of a Dominion -Provincial Conference in order that such matters may be transferred to provincial jurisdiction as may be mutually acceptable to the Indian people, provincial and federal authorities.'(f.93) The Diefenbaker government did not manage to convene a conference, but newly elected prime minister Lester Pearson put Indian issues on the agenda for November 1963. In preparation for the gathering, Saskatchewan government officials dusted off the 1960 brief and reiterated the main points.(f.94) The basic position continued to be that if Indians were to have equal status with other Canadians, jurisdiction over Indian affairs would have to devolve on the provinces.(f.95)

Woodrow S. Lloyd, who had succeeded Douglas as premier in 1961, led the Saskatchewan delegation to the conference. He laid down three conditions for the transfer: it had to proceed 'on the basis of an appropriate and

realistic timetable'; the federal government had to accept a continuing financial obligation, the details of which would be negotiated; and there had to be 'full and adequate discussions' with Indians and Indian organizations.(f.96) Lloyd pointedly did not say that devolution required the consent of Indians. The provincial government had perhaps learned its lesson when it promised not to give Indians the vote without first obtaining their approval, and had subsequently gone back on its word. Everett Wood, the Saskatchewan minister of municipal affairs who in 1962 was given responsibility for Indian and Metis issues,(f.97) also spoke at the federal - provincial conference. He called for the repeal of all sections of the Indian Act which defined the status of the Indian 'in grossly different terms from the status of non - Indians.' He further requested that the provinces be allowed to deliver services to Indians and to carry out community and economic development projects on reserves. The only area where he advised continuing federal authority, until such time as Indian bands were ready to discuss the matter, was title over reserve lands. Wood did say, however, that band funds held in trust by the Indian Affairs branch might in the near future be placed under the control of the public trustee of the province in order that bands could have easier access to these accounts.(f.98)

Guy Favreau, speaking for the government of Canada, agreed with the premise that the progress of Indian people depended upon their receiving provincial services, especially health, education, welfare, and municipal services. He acknowledged that Indians were being denied the assistance of a large body of professional staff of provincial and municipal governments who would otherwise be helping them to solve their problems. For the federal government to attempt to duplicate such services in small, widely scattered reserve communities was both expensive and inefficient. In supporting the principle of devolution, qualified only by the proviso that the federal government would not abdicate its constitutional and treaty obligations concerning Indians 'in respect to the status of Indian lands and in regard to any special or extraordinary services, over and above those which can be provided by the provinces, which are now being supplied or which may be required in the future,'(f.99) Favreau was saying nothing new. Integration and 'cooperation with the provinces in extending service to the Indian' had been federal government policy since the adoption of the 1948 report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs.(f.100) The difficulty was in working out the details, particularly the financial arrangements, for the transfer of responsibility to the provinces. The final report of the conference recognized 'that the time has come to find the basis on which the widest possible range of Federal, Provincial and Municipal services can be extended to Indians,' but added 'that none of the Governments is committed at this stage.'(f.101) Specifics were to be sorted out at a follow - up conference held in the fall of 1964, by which time the CCF were out of office.(f.102)

The Saskatchewan government put what was, from their point of view, a hopeful interpretation on the outcome of the November 1963 meeting. Wood enthusiastically informed the press that transfer of Indian administration was 'likely to be accomplished over a period of time.'(f.103) The level of optimism in the provincial government was suggested by a memo from Meyer Brownstone, the deputy minister of municipal affairs, about the need for a strategy to pacify federal Indian Affairs bureaucrats who were about to lose their jobs.(f.104) Provincial officials seemed to think that the dissolution of the Indian Affairs branch was imminent.

Indians were not invited to the 1963 federal - provincial conference, despite the fact that their future was being determined. Nor did Saskatchewan Indians participate in the preparation of the provincial government's brief. At an officials' meeting prior to the conference, the idea was raised of asking for input from the FSI, but Martin Greenwood, director of the Community Development branch of the Department of Municipal Affairs, which had superseded the Provincial Committee on Minority Groups in September 1962, 'expressed reservations about too great an involvement on the part of the Federation inasmuch as it is a relatively new organization and might not have formed a consensus of opinion among its members regarding the advisability of the province being responsible for their welfare.'(f.105) The officials decided that 'at the proper time' Indians should be informed

about what the province was doing. After the brief had been written, Greenwood invited Tootosis and the other members of the FSI executive to come to Regina to have a look at it. The invitation went out on 7 November 1963 for a meeting on 15 November, leaving very little time for the executive members to travel from all parts of the province to the capital, and there is no record of the meeting having taken place.(f.106)

The November 1963 conference agreed that Native peoples had to be consulted 'and their support obtained' if devolution of Indian Affairs to the provinces was to succeed.(f.107) The provincial government was more cautious, promising only 'full and adequate discussions' with Indians. It sent a letter in February 1964 to all the chiefs in Saskatchewan explaining that the government was willing to send representatives to reserve meetings called to discuss provincial control of Indian affairs.(f.108) Brownstone made it clear, however, that the government would not necessarily do what the Indians wanted: 'While I am unable to give you any assurance that the government will always be able to meet Indian requests, I can and do assure you that all representations will receive complete and careful consideration.'(f.109)

Beginning in March, Jack Emms, a community development officer in the Department of Municipal Affairs, attended meetings on various reserves throughout the province. His set speech opened with an assurance that nothing being proposed would alter the existing treaties signed with the queen. He noted that, by agreement with the federal government, Indians were already benefiting from some provincial programs. Twenty - one agreements had been signed between the Indian Affairs branch and the Saskatchewan Department of Education permitting 1585 treaty Indian pupils to attend provincial schools. In addition, the provincial Department of Natural Resources had spent over \$1 million developing the fishing industry, and \$300,000 in price supports for fish. These expenditures had benefited treaty Indians as well as other Saskatchewan people. Agreements had been reached enabling Indians to enter all general hospitals, provincial tuberculosis hospitals, and mental hospitals and to participate in the Saskatchewan Hospital Services Plan. Emms went on to say that Indians could receive many other desirable provincial government programs, including Department of Agriculture assistance for reserve farms, improved social welfare services, and medicare coverage. The provincial strategy was to sell jurisdictional transfer as an opportunity for Indians to receive better services, rather than as a 'takeover' of the Indian Affairs branch. Emms predicted that Indians would have more control over their own destiny under the new system, hinting, for example, at a role for Indians in the administration of welfare programs at the local level. Indians could also have representation on school boards and rural municipal councils, a proposal that implied the disappearance of reserves as separate units of administration and the integration of their residents with the surrounding non - Indian community.(f.110)

The reserve meetings followed a predictable pattern. After Emms had given his speech, the audience invariably ignored what he had said and talked about other things. His agenda was not their agenda. Those who attended used the occasion to air specific grievances on any number of topics ranging from unfair hunting and trapping regulations, to inadequate relief payments, to the failure to set up an Indian Claims Commission to settle unfulfilled treaty entitlements.(f.111) A few Indian leaders expressed reservations about the provincial government's plans. At the Red Pheasant Reserve, with fifty to sixty band members in attendance, Chief Nicotine asked: 'Now in regard to inter - provincial services and the May conference on the Indian question, I would like to know do we have to become provincial recipients. Indians should be free from taxation, hospitalization, etc. Will Mr. Emms explain this to us?' Lennox Wuttunee commented, 'I am not too concerned with social services, what I am concerned about is the municipalities taking over our reserves and that we will be paying taxes. Will the Province understand the Indians and their ways of thinking and living? I think a sudden taking over by the Province will hurt the Indians.'(f.112) What is interesting is the low level of direct confrontation and open conflict, the absence of hard - hitting speeches insisting that Ottawa honour its treaty obligations and trust relationship with Indians. The same reaction, Greenwood reported, was found at the October 1963 FSI conference: 'Some interest was shown on the

possibility of a provincial take-over of Indian affairs by a few, but this interest was not generally expressed.'(f.113) At this stage, the Indian response was to raise a wall of indifference against the provincial government's proposals. The more assertive opposition to integration came in the 1970s in the wake of the white paper.

Lloyd's reading of the situation was that 'the idea [of provincial administration of Indian Affairs] may not be fully approved by the Indians at the moment because they appear to have some concern about retaining privileges and the security, even though it is minimum, they enjoy under the federal treaties.'(f.114) It is surprising, therefore, to find Ray Woollam, former executive director of the Provincial Committee on Minority Groups, writing to Lloyd in October 1963: 'I am convinced that we would not be hard pressed to generate a favourable response from the FSI on the matter of total decentralization. They, in turn, are capable of effecting a receptive climate on the Reserves.'(f.115) At no time did Tootoosis, the FSI chief, or other members of the FSI executive give their support to 'decentralization.' Tootoosis stated that no changes should occur without the approval of the Indian bands affected.(f.116) His position was that 'full and adequate discussion' was not enough; Indian consent was required before jurisdictional transfer took place. Woollam may have had personal reasons for exaggerating Indian friendliness to provincial takeover. His comment about 'generating a favourable response from the FSI on the matter of total decentralization' was contained in a letter asking Lloyd to give him a contract to prepare a report on how provincial government services might be delivered on reserves.(f.117) The chances of obtaining the contract would obviously be enhanced if Lloyd thought that Indians could be persuaded to welcome the change.

The most compelling reason for doubting that the FSI would ever give their approval to shifting government responsibility for Indian affairs was the impact on treaties. Provincial control would lead to integration, and integration, in turn, would lead to the termination of the treaties. A basic premise of provincial policy was that the rate of Indian population increase made migration off the reserves both inevitable and desirable - inevitable, because the reserves did not have the economic base to support the increased numbers, and desirable, because mingling of Indians and non-Indians would promote integration. The provincial government took the position that as long as reserve Indians were treated differently from non-reserve Indians, they would be afraid to leave the reserves. If the province, rather than the federal government, delivered services on the reserves, the impediment to integration would be removed. Initially, the federal government, as a result of its constitutional responsibility and treaty obligations, would compensate the province financially, but, as Indians became more self-sufficient and capable of paying taxes, the federal government would withdraw, leaving Indians with no special rights derived from the treaties. Indians would receive and pay for government services in exactly the same way as did all other citizens of the province.

Examples abound of provincial ministers referring to the treaties in less than flattering terms. Sturdy, minister responsible for Indians and Metis from 1956 to 1960, said of Treaty 4, 'This finality, this seemingly insurmountable roadblock towards progress of the Indian people must be removed.'(f.118) Douglas wondered why Indians were on reserves - 'We don't settle all the Chinese people out in some corner of Canada or some corner of the province' - as though Chinese immigrants and treaty Indians had the same legal status and should be treated the same way.(f.119) Everett Wood, Indian and Metis minister from 1962 to 1964, remarked: 'Treaties were drawn up that gave to the Indians certain rights and guarantees. But hereby was established a policy of apartheid that parallels closely that which we decry in South Africa today ... One of the main factors tending to perpetuate the segregation we have is the fact that we have a definite division drawn between Treaty Indians and the rest of our population by the Indian Act, which makes them wards of the Federal Government. We can never have anything approaching complete integration between us so long as this situation remains.'(f.120)

Statements characterizing the treaties as roadblocks to be removed and the source of evils akin to apartheid are difficult to reconcile with the provincial government's oft-repeated vows to uphold the treaties 'as long as the sun

shines and the rivers flow.' The contradiction can be resolved, at least in part, by remembering that the Saskatchewan government hoped that the opportunities afforded by integration would be so attractive that Indians would voluntarily give up their treaty rights. Reneging on the treaties would be counterproductive because it would cause anger and fear, neither of which was conducive to integration. Sturdy explained his attitude to the treaties by recalling his experience as a high school principal when he learned 'that in order to solve the many problems in my school, disciplinary problems among children and adolescents, it was unwise to resort to force.'(f.121) He compared Indians to children who needed guidance, but who would rebel if the guiding hand was too visible and direct. Thus, Sturdy opposed repealing the Indian Act, cancelling the treaties, or abolishing the reserves, not because he believed in the moral or legal permanence of these commitments, but for the pragmatic reason that Indians who suddenly lost their minimal safety net would lack confidence to integrate with the rest of society.(f.122) Douglas made the same point - integration was necessary, but could not be forced: 'I think almost everyone who has studied this question, recognizes that the only way you can (a) improve the lot of the Indian and (b) integrate the Indian into the Canadian community, is gradually to make available to the Indian the same services that are available to the rest of the people of the community on the same basis. This will mean eventually accepting the responsibilities of other citizens including the paying of taxes, and getting other services which are available. I say, gradually, because some of them will not want to leave the reserves. This is not the kind of thing you can force on people.' The CCF government supported the treaties in the sense of not wanting them immediately terminated, but did not support them in the sense of hoping that integration would render them obsolete.

This understanding of the treaties was very different from the one held by John Tootoosis.(f.123) Speaking on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of Treaty 6 he said:

So I am very thankful to be here with you, in this great celebration, to be grateful to live to see a day like this, and pass it on, pass on the importance of our treaties to our young generation, to hang onto those treaties together, to have an ongoing fight together, for the treaties, their lands, so when we are called and are gone, they will have a place they can call home, this is all the land we have left. Since the time of the treaties, that is what I'll talk to you about now, the true meaning of making such an important agreement. In English, Nation to Nations are the only ones that can sign a treaty. When the treaty was signed they accepted us as a nation, that is the reason it is a treaty. In Cree it means a nation of people making a treaty of agreement with another nation of people.(f.124)

For Tootoosis, treaties were a permanent life - support system for Indian nations; they signified a reality that forever ruled out integration. For the Saskatchewan CCF government, the treaty was a temporary stopping place on the way to Indian integration. The provincial government worked from a model based on individual rights; Tootoosis and the FSI from a model based on group rights.

Saskatchewan Indian policy from 1944 to 1964 reflected the liberal values of equality, individualism, and freedom. The policy can be summarized with words borrowed from the 1969 white paper: 'This Government believes in equality. It believes that all men and women have equal rights. It is determined that all shall be treated fairly and that no one shall be shut out of Canadian life, and especially that no one shall be shut out because of his race.'(f.125) That a Liberal government should espouse liberal philosophy comes as no surprise; that a CCF government should do so requires some explanation. The liberal ideological strain in Canadian socialism is a matter of record.(f.126) The Regina Manifesto, the CCF founding document, strongly endorsed the liberal principles of 'freedom of speech and assembly for all; repeal of Section 98 of the Criminal Code; amendment of the Immigration Act to prevent the present inhuman policy of deportation; equal treatment before the law of all residents of Canada irrespective of race nationality or religious or political belief.'(f.127) The Saskatchewan CCF government was proud of its civil rights record. It adopted Canada's first provincial Bill of Rights, as well as the Fair

Practices and Fair Accommodations acts. At the first ministers' conference in 1950, Douglas tried in vain to persuade his fellow premiers and the prime minister of the need for a constitutional bill of rights for Canada.(f.128)

The CCF'S tendency to draw on the liberal elements in its ideology when shaping its Indian policy was reinforced by a strong desire to fight racial discrimination. Whether it was Jews in Germany during the Hitler era, Japanese in Canada during the Second World War, blacks in the United States under Jim Crow laws, or Indians segregated on reserves, the lesson was the same. Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or race could not be tolerated. What the CCF failed to realize was that anti - discrimination, though very important, was not enough. Civil rights laws protect individuals, not groups, and, to the extent that they promote assimilation and integration, they weaken community.(f.129) The CCF government's vision of a Saskatchewan where Indian poverty would be overcome by putting an end to segregation and enabling Aboriginal people to participate as equal citizens enjoying the same rights, opportunities, and responsibilities as did other citizens was incompatible with Indian nationalism. In the words of John Tootoosis, 'I come from the Poundmaker Reserve. That Poundmaker Reserve is neither Saskatchewan nor Canada. It is my nation.'(f.130)

Both the 1969 white paper and the Saskatchewan CCF government policy bring into focus the paradigm shift that has occurred in Canadian Indian policy since the 1970s.(f.131) The Trudeau government's retraction of the white paper in 1971, the recognition of 'existing aboriginal and treaty rights' in the 1982 constitution, and the broadening consensus on the inherent right of Indian self - government evident in the discussions surrounding the doomed Charlottetown accord all point to the obsolescence of liberal, integrationist Indian policy. A new paradigm based on a 'permanent organic relationship' between the First Nations and the Canadian state, each respecting the other's autonomy and seeking peaceful coexistence, has become the new progressive orthodoxy.

Footnotes:

(f.1) Rick Ponting and Roger Gibbins, *Out of Irrelevance: A Socio -political Introduction to Indian Affairs in Canada* (Toronto: Butterworth 1980), 29

(f.2) Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969, 11

(f.3) Ponting and Gibbins, *Out of Irrelevance*, 327 - 31; Sally M. Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda, 1968 - 1970* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1981), 53 - 6; Olive Patricia Dickason, *Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart 1992), 386; J.R. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian - White Relations in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1989), 225 - 9

(f.4) Tim Schouls, John Olthuis, and Diane Engelstad, 'The Basic Dilemma: Sovereignty or Assimilation,' in Diane Engelstad and John Bird., eds., *Nation to Nation: Aboriginal Sovereignty and the Future of Canada* (Concord, Ont.: Anansi 1992), 16

(f.5) Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy*, 53

(f.6) Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*, 224

(f.7) Ibid.

(f.8) Stephen Clarkson and Christina McCall, *Trudeau and Our Times*, vol. 1: *The Magnificent Obsession* (Toronto:

McClelland & Stewart 1990), 92 - 3

(f.9) Ponting and Gibbins, *Out of Irrelevance*, 25, 328; Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy*, 55; M. Patricia Marchak, *Ideological Perspectives on Canada* (Toronto: McGraw - Hill Ryerson 1975), 2, 12 -15

(f.10) Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy*, 27

(f.11) Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1961 Census of Canada, Series SP, Population, Ethnic Groups

(f.12) Thomas H. McLeod and Ian McLeod, *Tommy Douglas: The Road to Jerusalem* (Edmonton: Hurtig 1987), 139 - 40; F. Laurie Barron, 'The CCF and the Development of Metis Colonies in Southern Saskatchewan during the Premiership of T.C. Douglas, 1944 - 1961,' *Canadian Journal of Native Studies* 10 (1990): 244

(f.13) Dianne Lloyd, *Woodrow: A Biography of W.S. Lloyd* (Woodrow Lloyd Memorial Fund 1979), 140

(f.14) Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy*, 4

(f.15) Saskatchewan Archives Board (SAB), T.C. Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864d 49 4/6, memo, 3 March 1959

(f.16) Regina Leader - Post, 22 March 1946

(f.17) Ibid., 8 March 1946; Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, R.H. Wooff, 18 March 1954; J.H. Sturdy, 2 March 1956

(f.18) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, WJ. Berezowsky, 2 March 1954

(f.19) Ibid., 23 Feb. 1956

(f.20) Ibid., Arnold Feusi, 2 March 1954

(f.21) Ibid., R.H. Wooff, 18 March 1954

(f.22) Ibid., W.H. Wahl, 22 Feb. 1954; Arnold Feusi, 2 March 1954

(f.23) Ibid., H.C. Dunfield, 4 March 1954; J.R. Barrie, 11 March 1957

(f.24) Ibid., H.C. Dunfield, 2 March 1956; see also James Ripley, 2 March 1956.

(f.25) Leader - Post, 22 March 1946

(f.26) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, J.H. Sturdy, 22 March 1957

(f.27) Leader - Post, 8 March 1946

(f.28) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, W.H. Wahl, 22 Feb. 1954

(f.29) Ibid., W.H. Wahl, 18 March 1954

- (f.30) Ibid., W.J. Berezowsky, 18 March 1954; Eldon Johnson, 30 March 1961
- (f.31) Peter Czowski, 'This Is Our Alabama,' Maclean's, 6 July 1963
- (f.32) SAB, W.S. Lloyd Papers, R - 61.8 XXI 125b 1/2, J.H. Brockelbank to Mrs James J. Reeb, 17 March 1965
- (f.33) Ibid., R - 61.8 XXI 125b 2/2, W.S. Lloyd and F.A. Dewhurst to Mrs Martin Luther King, Jr, 10 April 1968
- (f.34) Government of Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 12, 16 and 17 June 1960, 1039 - 41
- (f.35) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, W.J. Berezowsky, 23 Feb. 1956
- (f.36) Ibid., 2 March 1956; interview, Allan Quandt, La Ronge, 23 Oct. 1992
- (f.37) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, W.J. Berezowsky, 23 Feb. 1956; see also Berezowsky's motion on 2 March 1954.
- (f.38) Ibid., Arnold Feusi, 2 March 1954
- (f.39) Ibid., J.H. Sturdy, 18 March 1954
- (f.40) Ibid., W.J. Berezowsky, 18 March 1954
- (f.41) Ibid. 2 March 1956
- (f.42) Ibid., Eldon Johnson, 30 March 1961
- (f.43) Ibid., W.J. Berezowsky, 2 March 1956
- (f.44) Ibid., J.H. Sturdy, 22 March 1957
- (f.45) Ibid., 2 March 1956
- (f.46) Douglas Papers, R - 33.7 1291a, Committee on Indian Affairs, First Report, 19 Nov. 1956
- (f.47) Leader - Post, 31 Jan. 1947
- (f.48) Douglas Papers, R - 33.2 XXII 400 (24 - 1 - 7), Dan Kennedy to Morris Shumiatcher, 4 Feb. 1947
- (f.49) Leader - Post, 12 March 1947; Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864a (49) 1/6, Joseph Joubert to Radio Station CKCK, 28 Feb. 1947
- (f.50) Government of Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 12, 16 and 17 June 1960, 1041

- (f.51) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864 (49) 3/6, Angus Mirasty and William B. Charles to T.C. Douglas, 9 April 1956
- (f.52) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864d (49) 4/6, W.I. Wuttunee to J.H. Sturdy, 6 July 1958
- (f.53) The Government of Saskatchewan hosted the conference and paid total expenses of \$5707. Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 X 396 (10 - 1 - 2), H.S. Lee to A.W. Johnson, 17 Nov. 1958
- (f.54) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864d (49) 4/6, J.H. Sturdy to all ministers, 29 June 1959, quoting address by Douglas, 30 Oct. 1958
- (f.55) Ibid., Provincial Conference of Saskatchewan Indian Chiefs and Councillors, 30 and 31 Oct. 1958
- (f.56) Canadian Plains Research Center, University of Regina, Indian History Film Project Records, interview, John Tootoosis, No. IH - ST.02, 14 July 1976
- (f.57) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864d (49) 4/6, Provincial Conference of Saskatchewan Indian Chiefs and Councillors, 30 and 31 Oct. 1958
- (f.58) Interview, John Tootoosis
- (f.59) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.1 134, Minutes of a joint meeting of the executive of the FSI with the Government Committee on Indian Affairs, 12 Dec. 1958
- (f.60) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864e (49) 5/6, R. Woollam to T.C. Douglas and J.H. Sturdy, 15 Jan. 1960
- (f.61) The name 'Provincial Committee on Minority Groups' was a misnomer in that the only minority groups within its purview were Indians, Metis, and Hutterites. Lloyd Papers, R - 61.1 134, Minutes of Committee on Indian Affairs, 3 March 1958; Douglas Papers, R - 33.7 1291B, Report on a Permanent Organization of the Provincial Committee on Minority Groups
- (f.62) There is evidence that Woollam experienced a loss of Christian faith. He referred to himself as a 'has - been theolog' and began a memo, 'Since abandoning the art of prayer ...' Lloyd Papers, R - 61.1 137 (M - I), R. Woollam to H.S. Lee, 19 April 1962
- (f.63) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.8 IX 38 (900) 1/2, J.H. Brockelbank of CCF caucus, 12 Feb. 1965
- (f.64) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864e (49) 5/6, R. Woollam to T.C. Douglas and J.H. Sturdy, 15 Jan. 1960
- (f.65) Ed and Pemrose Whelan, *Touched by Tommy* (Regina: Whelan Publications 1990), 82
- (f.66) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, T.C. Douglas, 11 March 1960
- (f.67) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864e (49) 5/6, Dan Kennedy to T.C. Douglas, 20 Feb. 1960
- (f.68) Ibid., T.C. Douglas to Dan Kennedy, 23 Feb. 1960

- (f.69) Ibid., R - 33.1 CXXXIII 961a (150) 1/2, R. Woollam to J.H. Sturdy, 22 March 1960
- (f.70) Ibid.
- (f.71) Leader - Post, 22 March 1946
- (f.72) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, W.H. Wahl, 22 Feb. 1954
- (f.73) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864c (49) 3/6, Ochankugahe to T.C. Douglas, 17 Feb. 1956
- (f.74) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, W.J. Berezowsky, 2 March 1956
- (f.75) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864e (49) 5/6, R. Woollam to J.H. Sturdy, 22 March 1960
- (f.76) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.1 I 37 (M - I), Saskatchewan Government News Release, 5 Aug. 1960
- (f.77) Ibid., R - 61.1 I 34, R. Woollam to T.C. Douglas, 11 Oct. 1960
- (f.78) Interview, John Tootosis
- (f.79) Douglas Papers, K - 33.1 CXXXIII 961a (150) 1/2, R Woollam to J.H. Sturdy, 22 March 1960; Lloyd Papers, R - 61.1 I 34, R Woollam to T.C. Douglas, 11 Oct 1960
- (f.80) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864e (49) 5/6, R Woollam to J.H. Sturdy, 22 March 1960
- (f.81) Lloyd Papers, K - 61.8 IX 38a, statement signed by R Woollam
- (f.82) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, J.H. Sturdy, 22 March 1957
- (f.83) Douglas Papers, R - 33.1 XLV 864d (49) 4/6, J.G. Diefenbaker to T.C. Douglas, 26 Feb. 1959
- (f.84) Government of Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 12, 16 and 17 June 1960, 1033
- (f.85) Ibid.
- (f.86) Ibid., 104
- (f.87) Ibid., 1081
- (f.88) Ibid., 1097
- (f.89) Ibid., 1058
- (f.90) Ibid.
- (f.91) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, Eldon Johnson, 30 March 1961

(f.92) Ibid., T.C. Douglas, 3 April 1961

(f.93) SAB, E.I. Wood Papers, R - 420 11 19b, Excerpt from the Report to the Senate and the House of Commons by the Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs, 8 July 1961

(f.94) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.1 I 37 (T - 1), Minutes, Staff Committee on Indian Affairs, 4 Oct. 1963

(f.95) Wood Papers, R - 420 II 5b, Remarks by E.I. Wood, 7 March 1963

(f.96) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.4 IX 130c (9 - 12), Dominion - Provincial Conference, Excerpt from Premier's Statement, Nov. 1963

(f.97) On 1 Sept. 1962 the functions of the Provincial Committee on Minority Groups were transferred to the Community Development Branch of the Department of Municipal Affairs. Wood Papers, R - 420 II 5a, M. Brownstone to deputy minister of agriculture et al.

(f.98) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.4 XXII 534 (21 - 32 - 9), Statement by the Hon. E.I. Wood, Ottawa, 28 Nov. 1963

(f.99) Ibid., Federal brief circulated to the provinces on Indian affairs, prior to Dominion - Provincial meeting, 28 and 29 Nov. 1963

(f.100) John L. Tobias, 'Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's Indian Policy,' in J.R. Miller, ed., Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian - White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991), 139

(f.101) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.4 XXII 534 (21 - 32 - 9), Report to the Plenary Session of the Conference of the Committee on the Administration of Indian and Eskimo Affairs, November 1963

(f.102) According to Sally Weaver, the federal - provincial discussions for a transfer of responsibility for delivering services to Indians from Ottawa to the provinces foundered in the 1960s because 'most provinces continued to argue that Indians were a federal responsibility.' Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy, 27

(f.103) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.4 IX 130c (9 - 12), Leader - Post, 4 Dec. 1963

(f.104) Ibid., R - 61.4 XXII 534 (21 - 32 - 9), M. Brownstone to E.I. Wood, 15 Jan. 1964

(f.105) Ibid., R - 61.1 I 37 (T - 1) Minutes, Staff Committee on Indian Affairs, 18 Sept. 1963

(f.106) Wood Papers, R - 420 II 19b, M. Greenwood to J. Tootoosis, 7 Nov. 1963. None of the members of the FSI executive of the time is still living, and efforts to locate Martin Greenwood have been unsuccessful.

(f.107) SAB, M. Brownstone Papers, R - 437 III 9, Excerpt from Budget Debate speech by E.I. Wood, 28 Feb. 1964

(f.108) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.4 IX 130x (9 - 12), M. Brownstone to all chiefs, 14 Feb. 1964

(f.109) Brownstone Papers, R - 437 III 9, M. Brownstone to J. Tootoosis, 14 Feb. 1964

- (f.110) Ibid., Address regarding extension of provincial services to Saskatchewan Indians; Provincial Consultation Meeting with Indians, Little Black Bear Reserve, 3 April 1964
- (f.111) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.4 IX 130c (9 - 12), Provincial Consultation Meetings with Indians, Poorman's Reserve, 2 April 1964; Little Black Bear Reserve, 3 April 1964
- (f.112) Brownstone Papers, R - 437 III - 9, Report of Red Pheasant Indian Reserve Band Meeting, 9 March 1964
- (f.113) Wood Papers, R - 420 II 19a, M. Greenwood to G.J. Darychuk, 7 Nov. 1963
- (f.114) Lloyd Papers, R - 61.4 IX 130c (9 - 12). Leader - Post. 4 Dec. 1963
- (f.115) Ibid., R. Woollam to W.S. Lloyd, 31 Oct. 1963
- (f.116) Ibid., R - 61.4 XXII 534 (21 - 32 - 9), J. Tootoosis to W.S. Lloyd, 13 April 1964
- (f.117) Ibid., R - 61.4 IX 130c (9 - 12), R. Woollam to W.S. Lloyd, 31 Oct. 1963
- (f.118) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, J.H. Sturdy, 22 March 1957
- (f.119) Ibid., T.C. Douglas, 2 March 1956
- (f.120) Brownstone Papers, R - 437 III 9, Excerpt from Budget Debate speech by E.I. Wood, 28 Feb. 1964
- (f.121) Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates, J.H. Sturdy, 22 March 1957
- (f.122) Government of Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 12, 16 and 17 June 1960, 1042, 1100
- (f.123) See Jean Goodwill and Norma Sluman, John Tootoosis (Winnipeg: Pemmican Publications 1984).
- (f.124) Canadian Plains Research Center, University of Regina, Indian History Film Project Records, No. IH - ST.04, John Tootoosis, 'Treaty 6 and Its Meaning,' 20 July 1976
- (f.125) Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969, 6
- (f.126) William Christian and Colin Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada: Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, Nationalists (Toronto: McGraw - Hill Ryerson 1974), 133, 158
- (f.127) Ibid., 133 - 4
- (f.128) McLeod and McLeod, Tommy Douglas, 256 - 7
- (f.129) For a good discussion of this issue in the United States context see Clayton R. Koppes, 'From New Deal to Termination: Liberalism and Indian Policy, 1933 - 1953,' Pacific Historical Review 46 (1977): 543 -66.

(f.130) 'My Reserve Is My Nation,' Saskatchewan Indian, April 1980, 6

(f.131) Sally M. Weaver, 'A New Paradigm in Canadian Indian Policy for the 1990s,' Canadian Ethnic Studies 22 (1990): 8 - 18

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