Indian Treaty-Making Policy in the United States and Canada, 1867-1877
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the family firm, however, this focus is a bit distorting. From a global perspective, the family-controlled and family-managed concern seems less of an anomaly than a norm. Colli acknowledges this reality, yet the bulk of his discussion remains mired in comparisons of European firms. Cambridge University Press would do well to make the title reflect the more narrow focus of this volume.

Beyond the narrow focus, students will be frustrated by the lack of social history and the frequent use of specialized terminology, such as "transaction costs" or "dynastic firm" with no definitions or brief explanations. Families are as rare as individuals in this volume. Invisible are the social factors that shape the family that defines the firm. And while the book dedicates an entire chapter to defining "family firm," there is little attention to explaining other key terms in business history. For a non-specialist or undergraduate, a few key definitions and a glossary are essential. When the author does define a term, it often comes well after its first appearance in the text. Students, for example, will have to read three pages of analysis of "capital intensive" industries before they will find a definition of the term. And I suspect that the vast majority of undergraduates in North America will not have sufficient background in the Buddenbrooks effect to follow Colli's discussion of resource allocation. Non-specialists and undergraduates might do well to start their study of business history with an alternative text.

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Indian Treaty-Making Policy in the United States and Canada, 1867-1877, by Jill St. Germain. Lincoln , Lincoln, Nebraska and London, University of Nebraska Press, 2001. xxii, 243 pp. $45.00 US (cloth), $29.95 US (paper).

Jill St. Germain has successfully interwoven narrative and analysis of the treaty-making process between governments and Native peoples on both sides of the North American international boundary during the first decade of Canadian Confederation. The core of her comparative investigation is directed at the contrast between the two stories. At the time, Canadians preened themselves that their generosity, justice and plain good sense spared them from the conflicts still erupting to the south. Even American politicians sometimes complained that Canada had discovered some economical secret that eluded Washington. There were major outbreaks of warfare in Minnesota in 1862 and in the Dakotas in 1866-67, and constant friction on the Texas frontier down to 1874. The Sioux wiped out detachments of the United States military in 1866 and, memorably, in 1876. Meanwhile, in a series of seven treaties between 1871 and 1877, Canada peaceably eradicated Native title all the way from north-western Ontario to the Rockies.

In fact, that the two processes barely overlapped in time. In 1787, the Constitution had assigned negotiations with indigenous people to the control of the Senate, as part of its treaty-making power. There were plenty of such treaties

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— over one hundred in the twenty years after the Mexican War — but American opinion gradually revolted against conducting relations with aboriginal peoples as if they were sovereign powers. In addition, the House of Representatives wanted a say in Western land issues, and in 1871 Congressional deadlock resulted in the ending of formal treaties within the bounds of the Republic. By contrast, for the new Canadian Dominion, treaty-making in the West represented the first steps in the outward projection of a still-colonial state. St. Germain thematically compares different aspects of the process. Treaties were invariably negotiated out West, on Native land although rarely upon their terms. Rather, government power was emphasized by meetings held at forts, with troops or police in support and, in Canada, the use of the Queen's name. Thus stage-managed, although there was some scope for local concessions, ratification by central government was rarely at issue. St. Germain examines the role of "Others" in the process, using inverted commas but apparently not in the anthropological sense. Missionaries, interpreters, and soldiers all played a role, while north of the border there also existed a potentially intermediary community, the Metis. The outcome of the agreements is similarly compared, to discuss the role of reserves ("reservations" in the United States) along with the mirror issues of "civilization" (the use of education in the English language and the transition to farming) and the preservation of the dwindling supply of buffalo. In both countries, much of this was pantomime, rituals criticized by racists for falsely encouraging Natives to believe they actually possessed some rights to the soil. St. Germain points to the irony that these dictated documents of abdication eventually rebounded through the modern legal process to validate claims to the very lands that Natives were being forced to abandon. Two detailed appendixes, supplemented by tables in the text, outline and compare the terms of the various treaties.

A few presentational criticisms should be noted of this handsome volume. It makes uneven use of abbreviations. There are a couple of regrettable lapses into slang and "England" (p. 5) is used loosely for Britain. Perhaps more notable is the absence of any disclaimer surrounding the use of the word "Indian." The traditional misidentification is undoubtedly convenient, it fits with the times and it is part of an established phrase — but there will be readers who will wish their heritage had been recognized, somewhere at least, in a more dignified term. The illustrations and maps are clear and helpful, but the latter would have been more so with the addition of a scale.

Should we co-opt the Indian treaties to serve the pleasant myth that Canada represents the gentler and wiser version of being North American? As St. Germain points out, far from being strategically thought-out, Canadian policy towards Native people was "almost schizophrenic" (p. 6), operating on entirely different principles east and west of the Great Lakes. The American frontier was fast filling with land-hungry settlers, but Canada's new backyard empire on the prairies aroused little enthusiasm and so gave Ottawa the precious commodity of time. By contrast, Canada hardly possessed the valuable asset of money: Washington spent more on its Indian relations than the entire Dominion budget. Wars cost money, and if there is no money, then conflict is best avoided. But one

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crucial element of the comparison, the demographic, is lacking. Nowhere are we given even an approximate idea of the populations of the various aboriginal nations north and south of the 49th parallel. It is impossible to understand the opening of western Canada without grasping that Native communities on the northern prairies had probably never been numerous, and were certainly down to a few tens of thousands by the mid-nineteenth century. Americans assumed that their Natives were dying out, but it is evident from the size of the reservations negotiated — most of the modern states of Oklahoma and South Dakota — that the numbers involved were far larger. St. Germain should not be singled out for blame over this omission: historians in general are demographically myopic. Canada could afford (in every sense of the word) to be both more confident and more generous in its negotiations with the original inhabitants of its western territories, simply because there were so many fewer of them.

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Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933-1939, by Greg Kennedy. Cass Series — Strategy and History, number 5. London, Frank Cass, 2002. xii, 313pp. $58.99 US (cloth).

In its most recent manifestation, the Anglo-American special relationship played out with the British joining the United States in the so-called "coalition" attack against Iraq in March to May 2003. As controversial as that linkage might have seemed to many, there are deep historical roots to a partnership that has not always been special or much of a relationship. This partnership furnished its greatest advantages in the period from May 1940 to June 1941 with the emergence of the "grand alliance." And, it reached its low point during the Suez crisis of 1956-57, when the United States forced the British to call off their invasion of Egypt.

A study of Anglo-American relations in the Far East from 1933 to 1939, writes Greg Kennedy, not only "forms a discrete contextual unit," but was the formative background to the special relationship (p. 3). Despite some antagonism between the two Atlantic powers after the First World War, certain developments spurred them into joint strategic decisions. In the Far East the perception of potential Japanese expansionism brought them to share "mental maps" of each other. The convergence derived from common interests relating both to America's "philosophical" empire and Britain's substantive empire of trade and possessions. What emerged was an Anglo-American relationship that Kennedy describes as "parallel but not joint" (p. 2). The larger issue that concerns him is that "The very nature of the great-power system was such that it demanded alliances and balance-of-power combinations that ensured that no one nation could remain above the others" (p. 4). Such considerations forced a concentration on the Far East where, unlike the European arena, the US worried about issues of security. It was this concern which produced the context for Anglo-

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