Provincial Governance

Legislature Passes Resolution to Ask Ottawa for Complete Control of Indian Affairs

Summary

The Saskatchewan legislature unanimously passed a resolution in 1961 to request that Ottawa transfer complete control over Indian Affairs administration to any province that wanted it. Premier Douglas suggested implementing a 25-year transition period for the transfer of power. Ottawa rejected the request from Saskatchewan.

Implications
The Saskatchewan provincial government sought to gain more unilateral control over Aboriginal affairs, but the federal government continued to hold onto as much control as possible under the law. While the CCF saw a transfer of power to provincial government as the best way to address issues directly effecting Indigenous peoples, the assumption that power should be given to the provincial government instead of local Indigenous governments shows the paternalistic approach that politicians perpetuated.
Sources

Glenbow Archives, M125, series VI, file 56, CCF 1954-61, Douglas, To my Indian Friends, 30 May 1960

Date
1961-00-00

Creation of Federation of Saskatchewan Indians

Summary

The Federation of Saskatchewan Indians came together in 1958, forming as a merger of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians and the Queen Victoria Treaty Protection Association. The Federation was based on an organization through which provincial and regional executives were derived from local band councils in each of the nine agencies. The group began receiving funding from the CCF government in 1961-1962. As part of receiving funding, the FSI adopted a new method of electing board members and created an official constitution. Previous to this, their leadership and organizational mandate had been unofficial. The Queen Victoria Protective Society dissolved around 1966, after the FSI began receiving government funding.

Implications
Input of the CCF into this organization may have been a means for the provincial government to exercise their influence over Aboriginal people. The CCF government was caught between two goals: the desire to assist the development of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians (FSI) as a strong, self-determining organization - and the desire to promote the integration of Indigenous people into mainstream society. Since the FSI received all funding from the Saskatchewan government, it was often accused of being controlled by the provincial government.
Sources

Glenbow Archives, M125, III “Correspondence, 1933-67,” f. 22, “Norris, 1945-1967 (Mining and Native Right),” M.F Norris to J. Brady, 15 February 1962; James Pitsula, “The Thatcher Government in Saskatchewan and Treaty Indian, 1964-1971: The Quiet Revolution,” Saskatchewan History 48, 1 (Spring 1996): 3-16;

Date
1958-00-00

Provincial Social Services to Off-Reserve Status Indians

Summary

Despite the recommendations of the Sturdy Committee that the provincial government not take on the provision of social services to Aboriginal people, the government declared in 1957 that it would provide full social aid services to all status Indians living off-reserve. This was seen by the provincial government as an important strategy in solving reliance on welfare.

Sources

SAB, S-M16, v. XIII, f.264, “Public Assistance, Indians and Metis, 1952-64,” J.S White to Col. Laval Fortier, 18 February 1958; White to Dr. G.F Davidson, 26 July 1960; White to J.W Erb, 19 February 1958.

Date
1957-00-00

Sturdy Committee Investigates Transfer of Jurisdiction

Summary

The provincial government sought to take greater responsibility for the control of services provided to Aboriginal people in the North, particularly because of historic neglect of northern policy. The CCF government made an agreement with Indian Affairs to engage in joint development and partial transfer of services to the provincial government. The committee appointed by the provincial government, headed by Sturdy, was tasked to examine the possibility of Saskatchewan taking over these services, though the report of the committee advised against the transfer. In the years that followed, the Department of Indian Affairs did not fulfill their part of the agreement as it related to the transfer, instead bolstering bureaucracy in the department by increasing staff and services.

Implications
Although the report of the Sturdy Committee advised against transfer of jurisdiction over Indigenous services, the CCF continued to promote this goal. Please see "Establishment of Sturdy Committee on Indians Affairs" for additional information.
Sources

SAB, Brockelbank Papers; Wheaton to Phelps, 30 April 1948; Wheaton to J.P.B Ostrander, 19 September 1947; Meeting report, Prov. and fed. reps. of Dept. of Indian Affairs, 7 October 1947; Minutes of Meetings of N. Co-ord. Committee, 23 April 1948; S-NR2, DNR, 19 (a), August 1944-April 1949, Min. of Natural Resources (Brockelbank)," Churchman to Phelps, 14 May, 1948

Sub Event
CCF Government Advocates for Transfer of Indigenous Services from Federal to Provincial Government
Date
1956-00-00

Establishment of Sturdy Committee on Aboriginal Affairs

Summary

The CCF government's integration policy began to take shape in the spring of 1956, when the cabinet established a Committee on Indian Affairs chaired by J.H. Sturdy. The committee's report became the basis for the government's policy. The report included three specific proposals: enfranchisement, removal of restrictions on the sale of liquor to Aboriginal peoples, and the transfer of responsibility for Indian affairs from the federal to the provincial government.

Result

Voting and drink reform, of course, did not revolutionize the lives of Indians. The FSI leadership made no attempt to have the franchise repealed and many, including John Tootoosis, were simply happy to have the issue behind them. By the same token, the rank and file seemingly acquiesced to the changes with either quiet indifference or passive acceptance. While some communities now became the subject of intense lobbying during elections, Indian participation in the larger political process remained only marginal and seldom altered the rhythm of reserve life. By the same token, the new liquor laws did not significantly modify the pattern of alcohol use, although the provision for reserve referenda did serve to localize and intensify the drink issue in reserve communities across the province. While provincial politicians were quick to admit that the new reforms did not, in themselves, fully integrate Indians into the wider society, they professed to see these measures as an important step in that direction.”

 

Barron, F.L., Walking in Indian Moccasins: the native policies of Tommy Douglas and the CCF, 136-137.

 

Implications
The lack of consultation with Aboriginal peoples worried Aboriginal leaders, and the federation of Saskatchewan Indians (FSI), who feared that, if carried out, the recommendations would impact their treaty rights. The government expected widespread approval of their plan, but when the report was announced Douglas agreed not to make any changes without the approval and consultation of Indigenous communities. In addition, Aboriginal organizations voiced concerns over enfranchisement. Since "enfranchisement" was a term used in the Indian Act to describe the legal process whereby someone would lose their 'Indian status,' the use of the term "franchise" by the government caused some leaders to view this as a final step towards integration and assimilation into Canadian settler society. Please see "Sturdy Committee Investigates Transfer of Jurisdiction" entry for additional information.
Sources

Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XVL 864d (49) 4.6, Provincial Conference of Saskatchewan Indian Chiefs and Councillors, 30 and 31 October 1958.

Pitsula, James. "The Saskatchewan CCF Government and Treaty Indians, 1944-1964." Canadian Historical Review 75, no. 1 (1994): 23-30.

Waiser, Bill. Saskatchewan: A New History. Calgary: Fifth House, 2005.

Date
1956-00-00

Relocation of Indigenous Residents from Uranium City

Summary

The provincial government, not wanting Indigenous residents within the vicinity of Uranium City or working at the nearby mine, relocated Indigenous encampents near or within the developing mining town, and prohibited their settlement within one mile of the town’s limits.


 

Result

According to a report prepared for the Department of Municipal Affairs, A Guide for Development, Uranium City and District., Uranium City housed tent encampents and isolated bush dwellings. These abodes were occupied by approximately 150 First Nations people, as well as 200 to 300 Métis. To further prevent the establishment of Indigenous dwellings in and around Uranium City, planners proposed that a boundary demarcate land 1.5-2 miles beyond the townsite unavailable for 'settlment.' It is noted that the policy was in effect but not rigidly applied.  This likely hindered the economic development and stability of Indigenous residents in the region, while also segregating them away from settler colonists who relocated north for employment. This was both a tactic of economic, social, and political isolation.  


 

Sources
  • Bothwell, R. Eldorado: Canada’s National Uranium Company. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984.
  • Izumi, Arnott. A Guide for Development, Uranium City and District. Regina: Department of Municipal Affairs, Community Planning Branch, 1956.
  • Robert Boschman, and Bill Bunn. "Nuclear Avenue: “Cyclonic Development”, Abandonment, and Relations in Uranium City, Canada." Humanities 7, no. 1 (2018): 5-20.

 

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Date
1953-00-00
Community

Provincial Government Requests Land Surrender on Kitsaki Reserve

Summary

The provincial government requested the surrender of a 139-acre portion of the Kitsaki reserve to expand the town of La Ronge. They stated that the land was unused by members of the band and could be better used to expand the townsite. The inhabitants of the reserve opposed the surrender, and the federal government found people living on that portion of land along with permanent homes, and rejected the request.

Implications
Ultimately, the Kitstaki reserve land was not surrendered.

In the 1870s, the Government of Canada negotiated various treaties with Indigenous peoples of the Prairies. One of the crucial elements promised in these treaties was land that would be reserved for the Indians. And yet, less than a dozen years into the new century, almost a quarter of those valuable reserves that were considered essential to enable Indians to make the transition to an agricultural economy had been surrendered back to the government. Many of the land surrenders that occurred on the Prairies raise arguments regarding the validity of the surrender. Indigenous communities often allege non-compliance with the Indian Act surrender procedures, being pressured to surrender under duress, undue influence on behalf of Indian agents and government officials, unconscionability, lack of informed consent, and breach of fiduciary obligations in the taking of the surrender itself and in the management and administration of the land and the proceeds after the surrender. Over 100 surrenders were obtained on the Prairies between 1896 and 1911, making way for western expansion and an influx of immigrants. Although government officials often argued that Indians had more land than they could use, many of these bands had experienced population loss due to epidemics - a population loss that was in part a product of the government's refusal to provide promised farming implements or food rations. The government played an active part in creating the conditions leading to population loss on reserves, and subsequently took advantage of the situation to gain reserve land from Indian bands. In addition, many of the nations that surrendered their land were in difficult financial situations, and were often indebted to the government. The sale of land was seen as a means to pay back their debts or to purchase much needed food, clothing and farming implements.

Evidence collected through various Indian Claims Commission inquiries suggest the land was often bought from the bands at a cost much lower than what it was resold at. For example, the government would offer the band $1.50/acre, and would then sell it to farmers or land developers for $3.00/acre. The government took advantage of the fact that the bands were in dire need of money and knowingly offered them less than what the land was worth. Most bands had little experience with real estate, land development and speculation, while government officials were well aware of the factors affecting land value and were well connected to the business community. In addition, the notions of private property and land division differed greatly from Indigenous philosophies of communal land use, ownership and responsibility. As with the signing of the numbered Treaties, historians and Indigenous community members have argued that cultural differences and power imbalances allowed for confusion and abuse in the processes of land surrender. As the buffalo populations were dwindling, many Indigenous nations were facing starvation, and entering into treaties was deemed by some leaders to be the best solution to avoid the complete loss of their bands. In this situation, government officials were in a position of power to negotiate treaty terms that were favourable to the Canadian state, although many Indigenous leaders did press the officials for better terms for their bands, and requested additional farming tools, schools and medicine chests. However, the government's failure to abide by the terms of the legally binding treaties was not uncommon; many bands never received promised farming implements / livestock, and food rations. Denied the opportunity and the proper tools to succeed in developing agricultural economies, many bands faced hardship and starvation as they once again negotiated the terms to land surrenders with government officials. As settler interest in western lands increased, the federal government responded with a series of Orders in Council and amendments to the Indian Act which increased the government’s control over reserve affairs and facilitated the surrender of treaty reserves. One such measure occurred in 1911 when an amendment to the Indian Act allowed the government to take reserve land without consent when the reserve was in or near a town of more than 8000 people, or where the land was needed for public purposes (please see database entry entitled: Laurier Government Gives Itself Power to Claim Reserve Land for further information on this subject). Although more research is required regarding this subject, some evidence suggests personal interest of Department officials played a part in generating demand for the surrender of Indian lands. The 1915 Ferguson Commission was appointed by the federal government to investigate Indian Affairs officials who were suspected of conflicts of interest in their dealings with reserve land surrenders. Please see database entry entitled: Ferguson Royal Commission for further information on this subject.

Finally, as aforementioned, Indigenous leaders and historians have pointed to issues pertaining to consent in the context of reserve land surrenders. The Indian Act of 1876 specified that consent for reserve land surrender had to be obtained from the "majority of the male members of the band at the full age of twenty-one years, at a meeting or council thereof summoned for that purpose according to their rules." Although it was clear from the Indian Act that a majority vote was required, there was much debate within government circles as to whether the “majority” referred to in the Act was a majority of only the qualified members attending the surrender meeting or an absolute majority of all eligible members of the band. Consequently, many land surrenders were premised on loosely interpreted consent rules. Evidence gathered through various Indian Claims Commissions suggests government officials employed coercive measures when negotiating reserve land surrenders. On occasion, cash was offered to band members to bribe them into accepting proposed land surrenders. In addition, as some deliberations lasted several days, and votes were taken multiple times, instances occurred where a majority of band members were absent or had left the negotiations, allowing the government to secure a vote in favour of land surrender.

The loss of reserve land had many detrimental consequences for Indigenous communities, who were already faced with traditional land base dispossession as European settlement increased rapidly on the Prairies. Despite the professed goals of the federal government to assist Indigenous people in their transition to agricultural economies, many bands were left with little to no farmable land, as the best fertile land was often part of the surrender. Evidence collected throughout various Indian Claims Commission inquiries also found that several bands failed to receive the payment amounts promised by the government, if any payment at all. The loss of large parcels of land also meant a reduced access to resources and traditional hunting grounds, loss of identity and cultural disconnection. It also signified a loss of self-sufficiency and autonomy. As fertile lands were surrendered, many bands struggled to provide sufficient food for their populations, increasing their dependency on the federal government. Federal economic policies such as an 1881 amendment to the Indian Act prohibiting the sale of agricultural products by Indian bands without the consent of the Indian Agent greatly contributed to the hardship many bands faced. Please see database entry entitled Indian Act Amendment: Regulations of sale of agricultural products for further information on this subject. To conclude, in the past 30 to 40 years, many Indigenous communities on the Prairies have undertaken negotiations with the federal government to obtain compensation, either land, financial or both, as a means to redress government wrongdoings in the cases of reserve land surrenders. The Indian Specific Claims Commission, which has investigated many reserve land surrenders in Canada, was established as a temporary independent advisory body authorized to review specific claims rejected by the government and to issue non-binding decisions.
Date
1950-00-00
Community

La Loche Residents Petition for a Road

Summary

Residents of Northern Saskatchewan observed that a lack of transportation routes hindered economic development in this region. As a result, they petitioned the provincial government to build a road to La Loche in 1950. The government considered this project unfeasible, citing a lack of available finances. Government officials also stated that it did not constitute a high priority project in Northern Saskatchewan. In response, volunteers from the area began to build the road by hand. Following this, the government built a winter road in 1960, and an all-season road in 1964. The residents of La Loche also asked the Department for financial assistance to proceed with plans for a Co-op store. The residents reported that the exorbitant prices charged at Hudson's Bay Company store, in addition to the already-high cost of northern living, were extortionate.

Implications
For those living in La Loche and similar northern communities (of which the majority population is Indigenous), a lack of transportation routes inhibited their ability to engage in economic development strategies and to be economically self-sufficient. Due to smaller overall population density (and a smaller voting base), Northern Aboriginal communities were frequently placed at a lower level on the government-funding priority list than other Saskatchewan communities as it related to public services.
Sources

SAB, R782, DNR (GR-24-3), v. I, f. 4, "Branch Heads Meetings, 1963-1968," "Minutes of the Branch Heads' Planning and Policy Committee," Meeting No. 53, Meadow Lake, SK, 16 September 1964; S-NR 1/5, v. 1, "General," f. 131, "Roads -- General -- 1956-61," A.G Kuziak to A.R Guy, 16 November 1961; R.N Gooding, "Construction Division Road Program for 1959-60," 22 May 1959

Date
1950-00-00
Community

Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Passed

Summary

The Saskatchewan Legislature passed the first Bill of Rights in Canada, making racial discrimination illegal, as well as discrimination based on other factors of identity.

Implications
Following World War II, governments worldwide had a newfound awareness and investment in ethics and the protection of minority rights (also seen in the Nuremberg Trials). The CCF's creation of the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights is reflective of this social shift, and would set a precedent throughout Canada that Diefenbaker's federal government would further expand on in 1960 with the Canadian Bill of Rights (and later the Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
Date
1947-00-00

Ochapowace Resolutions

Summary

Several members of the Ochapowace band, including Chief Ochapowace, met and drafted a list of resolutions dealing with the administration of their band at the council level. They criticized farming practices, complaining that they were unable to harvest their crops before winter and get them to market, requesting a ‘complete threshing outfit,’ increased access to one of the band’s tractors, improved roads in and out of the reserve, and relief for one destitute member of the band. They also protested the replacement of Chief Ochapowace. In a second correspondence from the Ochapowace band, several members alleged that they had been mistreated at the Broadview Hospital, and as such, expressed a preference to be hospitalized at the Whitewood Community Hospital.

Implications
Provincial officials to whom the group’s letter was addressed were hesitant to act on any of the resolutions, as the dissident group had no official standing within the band. They did, however, invest in road improvements. The group then sent another letter directly to Ottawa, who agreed with the provincial government.
Date
1947-07-28
Community