Community Breaking/Fracturing

Ratepayers' Association of Alingly Petitions for Opening of Little Red River Reserve

Summary

Members of the Ratepayers' Association of Alingly considered their community blocked on all sides by Wahpeton, Sturgeon Lake, and the Little Red River Reserve. Thus, they petitioned the government to have the Little Red River Reserve opened for settlement. They argued that there were only eight families living on a large tract of land in the northwest corner, and it could be put to better use by Euro-Canadian settlers. They also complained that reserve inhabitants used public roads, but did not contribute to their construction and upkeep. The Little Red River Reserve contained an area of 56 square miles, and according to a report from the local agent in December, 1912, there were ten families comprising 41 First Nations people residing on the reserve. Indian Affairs officials suggested the possibility of discussing a surrender of the reserve to be disposed of for the "benefit" of the those living on the reserve (sales of reserve land did not actually intend to benefit First Nations like Indian Affairs claimed).

The Land Surrender never commenced due to an investigation into the handling of the surrender by the DIA. It was described as "backhanded" and operated on the deception of both the Lac La Ronge and Montreal Lake Bands who had members residing on Little Red River IR No. 106A. Ultimately, despite the DIA's interest in a Land Surrender, they retracted their request because they had been caught by Archdeacon Mackay and Indian Agent Jackson in their mishandling obtaining consent from the LLRIB and Montreal Lake Band. Bribes and favours were frequently enlisted by the DIA to nefariously obtain access to land and resources protected under Treaty for First Nations. 


 

Result

In the 1870s, the Government of Canada negotiated various treaties with Indigenous peoples of the Prairies. One of the crucial elements promised in these treaties was land that would be reserved for the Indians. And yet, less than a dozen years into the new century, almost a quarter of those valuable reserves that were considered essential to enable Indians to make the transition to an agricultural economy had been surrendered back to the government. Many of the land surrenders that occurred on the Prairies raise arguments regarding the validity of the surrender. Indigenous communities often allege non-compliance with the Indian Act surrender procedures, being pressured to surrender under duress, undue influence on behalf of Indian agents and government officials, unconscionability, lack of informed consent, and breach of fiduciary obligations in the taking of the surrender itself and in the management and administration of the land and the proceeds after the surrender. Over 100 surrenders were obtained on the Prairies between 1896 and 1911, making way for western expansion and an influx of immigrants. Although government officials often argued that Indians had more land than they could use, many of these bands had experienced population loss due to epidemics - a population loss that was in part a product of the government's refusal to provide promised farming implements or food rations. The government played an active part in creating the conditions leading to population loss on reserves, and subsequently took advantage of the situation to gain reserve land from Indian bands. In addition, many of the nations that surrendered their land were in difficult financial situations, and were often indebted to the government. The sale of land was seen as a means to pay back their debts or to purchase much needed food, clothing and farming implements.

Evidence collected through various Indian Claims Commission inquiries suggest the land was often bought from the bands at a cost much lower than what it was resold at. For example, the government would offer the band $1.50/acre, and would then sell it to farmers or land developers for $3.00/acre. The government took advantage of the fact that the bands were in dire need of money and knowingly offered them less than what the land was worth. Most bands had little experience with real estate, land development and speculation, while government officials were well aware of the factors affecting land value and were well connected to the business community. In addition, the notions of private property and land division differed greatly from Indigenous philosophies of communal land use, ownership and responsibility. As with the signing of the numbered Treaties, historians and Indigenous community members have argued that cultural differences and power imbalances allowed for confusion and abuse in the processes of land surrender. As the buffalo populations were dwindling, many Indigenous nations were facing starvation, and entering into treaties was deemed by some leaders to be the best solution to avoid the complete loss of their bands. In this situation, government officials were in a position of power to negotiate treaty terms that were favourable to the Canadian state, although many Indigenous leaders did press the officials for better terms for their bands, and requested additional farming tools, schools and medicine chests. However, the government's failure to abide by the terms of the legally binding treaties was not uncommon; many bands never received promised farming implements / livestock, and food rations. Denied the opportunity and the proper tools to succeed in developing agricultural economies, many bands faced hardship and starvation as they once again negotiated the terms to land surrenders with government officials. As settler interest in western lands increased, the federal government responded with a series of Orders in Council and amendments to the Indian Act which increased the government’s control over reserve affairs and facilitated the surrender of treaty reserves. One such measure occurred in 1911 when an amendment to the Indian Act allowed the government to take reserve land without consent when the reserve was in or near a town of more than 8000 people, or where the land was needed for public purposes (please see database entry entitled: Laurier Government Gives Itself Power to Claim Reserve Land for further information on this subject). Although more research is required regarding this subject, some evidence suggests personal interest of Department officials played a part in generating demand for the surrender of Indian lands. The 1915 Ferguson Commission was appointed by the federal government to investigate Indian Affairs officials who were suspected of conflicts of interest in their dealings with reserve land surrenders. Please see database entry entitled: Ferguson Royal Commission for further information on this subject.

Finally, as aforementioned, Indigenous leaders and historians have pointed to issues pertaining to consent in the context of reserve land surrenders. The Indian Act of 1876 specified that consent for reserve land surrender had to be obtained from the "majority of the male members of the band at the full age of twenty-one years, at a meeting or council thereof summoned for that purpose according to their rules." Although it was clear from the Indian Act that a majority vote was required, there was much debate within government circles as to whether the “majority” referred to in the Act was a majority of only the qualified members attending the surrender meeting or an absolute majority of all eligible members of the band. Consequently, many land surrenders were premised on loosely interpreted consent rules. Evidence gathered through various Indian Claims Commissions suggests government officials employed coercive measures when negotiating reserve land surrenders. On occasion, cash was offered to band members to bribe them into accepting proposed land surrenders. In addition, as some deliberations lasted several days, and votes were taken multiple times, instances occurred where a majority of band members were absent or had left the negotiations, allowing the government to secure a vote in favour of land surrender.

The loss of reserve land had many detrimental consequences for Indigenous communities, who were already faced with traditional land base dispossession as European settlement increased rapidly on the Prairies. Despite the professed goals of the federal government to assist Indigenous people in their transition to agricultural economies, many bands were left with little to no farmable land, as the best fertile land was often part of the surrender. Evidence collected throughout various Indian Claims Commission inquiries also found that several bands failed to receive the payment amounts promised by the government, if any payment at all. The loss of large parcels of land also meant a reduced access to resources and traditional hunting grounds, loss of identity and cultural disconnection. It also signified a loss of self-sufficiency and autonomy. As fertile lands were surrendered, many bands struggled to provide sufficient food for their populations, increasing their dependency on the federal government. Federal economic policies such as an 1881 amendment to the Indian Act prohibiting the sale of agricultural products by Indian bands without the consent of the Indian Agent greatly contributed to the hardship many bands faced. Please see database entry entitled Indian Act Amendment: Regulations of sale of agricultural products for further information on this subject. To conclude, in the past 30 to 40 years, many Indigenous communities on the Prairies have undertaken negotiations with the federal government to obtain compensation, either land, financial or both, as a means to redress government wrongdoings in the cases of reserve land surrenders. The Indian Specific Claims Commission, which has investigated many reserve land surrenders in Canada, was established as a temporary independent advisory body authorized to review specific claims rejected by the government and to issue non-binding decisions.


 

Sources

Massie, Merle. Forest Prairie Edge. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2014. 104-106.

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Date
1906

Arrival of Forces of Colonel Garnet Wolseley in Manitoba

Summary

The arrival of the expedition under Colonel Garnet Wolseley in 1870 signalled a transition in the lives Indigenous peoples in Manitoba. The expedition included Ontario volunteers and Canadian settlers hoping to avenge the death of Thomas Scott. They acted in defiance of the rule of law. Winnipeg descended into mob rule in 1871 and 1872. The French Metis population was threatened continuously at the Land Office near Fort Garry, and French Metis entering Winnipeg were in jeopardy of being harmed.

Implications
The arrival of Wolseley’s force, and the continued flood of new settlers, many of whom were linguistically and religiously intolerant, led to a great exodus of many French Métis between 1870 and 1881. Many French Metis individuals migrated West into Saskatchewan. In some cases, they sold their land to incoming English Protestants as the Métis were being pushed out of their communities.
Date
1870-00-00

Red River Resistance, Manitoba Act of 1870 and Reign of Terror

Summary

The Manitoba Act was passed at the closing of the Red River Resistance in 1870, which provided for the province of Manitoba and allowed the Red River settlement to enter Confederation as Canada's fifth province. Prime Minister J.A. MacDonald stated that he would compensate the Metis in the new province in order to settle the west peacefully, although the provincial land would be owned publicly. There were also provisions in the Act which protected the French language and Roman Catholic religion. Section 31 of the Act provided land for the children of Metis heads of families, which amounted to 1.4 million acres, to be divided into tracts and allotted to Métis families by Lieutenant-Governor Adam Archibald. Section 32 guaranteed all previous settlers possession of the lots they occupied before 15 July 1870, as well as hay rights in the outer two miles of various river lots. An amendment to section 32 in 1874 provided $160 scrip redeemable by Métis heads of families. The 1874 amendment also stated that improvements needed to be made to the land in order to obtain the title. Following the creation of the Manitoba Act, Prime Minister MacDonald refused to distribute the land legally owed to Metis people. The plan of Lieutenant Governor Archibald was to allow the Metis to maintain the river lot system of farming and distribute the 1.4 million acres over a period of approximately one year. Distribution of land in fulfillment of section 31 took over a decade, however, causing many frustrated Metis people to migrate west into Alberta and Saskatchewan, as well as the United States. As well, government officials changed their minds about the 1.4 million acres, stating that the claimed land was now required to be outside the province of Manitoba. They also changed the date of proof of occupation to a date when most Metis would be away from their farms hunting buffalo. Shortly after the Act was passed, MacDonald sent 1200 troops to Fort Garry (now known as Winnipeg), to surveil and control the new province. The troops, as well as the influx of settlers, terrorized the Metis residents. Many Metis individuals were murdered, beaten, and raped. Metis landholders were frequently harassed in non-physical ways as well.


 

Result

The above summary of events demonstrates that there were several federal tactics employed to make it exceedingly difficult for the Metis to obtain their land title after scrip had been issued.  Prime Minister MacDonald actively vetoed the plans of Lieutenant Governor Archibald, in the hopes that delaying the distribution of land to the Metis would allow white settlers to outnumber the Metis, forcing them to leave.  These federal delay tactics were effective, as many Metis migrated, although they continued to petition the government in Ottawa to settle their outstanding claims.  As well, the Metis were still involved in the buffalo economy.  The government was aware that many Metis families left their farms for extended periods of time while on the hunt, during which they allowed non-Aboriginal settlers to occupy and steal Metis farm lots .  As a result of these federal tactics, approximately 65 percent of Metis people lost their land to non-Aboriginal homesteaders in Manitoba.

The efforts of MacDonald to send a large number of troops into the newly formed province demonstrate a retaliatory effort to keep the region under tight state control.  The permissive attitude of the government towards methods of psychological and physical intimidation including murder, physical beatings and rape of an already oppressed people would have served to severely fracture the sense of community safety and family cohesion.  The psychological trauma caused by rape in particular is known to have long-term and even intergenerational consequences for emotional and mental health if appropriate or sufficient social supports are not available.  These tactics of physical and psychological violence were used to keep the Metis in a position of political subordination.  The researcher notes that in the era of the modern state, criteria provided by the United Nations in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court would classify the actions of the government as war crimes (extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly) and crimes against humanity (murder, rape, persecution based on ethnicity). 


 

Sources
  • An Act to amend and continue the Act 32 and 33 Victoria, chapter 3 ; and to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of Manitoba, S.C. 1870, c. 3

 

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Date
1870-05-12
Documents
File

Tuberculosis at the Battleford Industrial School

Summary

In an 1891 visit to the Battleford school Haytor Reed noted the high number of sick children and the inadequate medical care or facilities. This was followed by a report from Indian Agent, J. Day (1910), regarding the death of a student. He noted that this was the third student to die of tuberculosis that month.

Implications
Tuberculosis was common and at frequently went rampant through Residential Schools, with high death rates that were not common upon settler populations. By 1907, 25% of 1537 students had died during their time spent in Residential Schools. This incredibly high death rate was reflective of the Crown's inattention, irresponsibility, apathy, and intention to assimilate and remove Indigenous populations for settler benefit. By looking at a multitude of Residential Schools, it shows a pattern of abuse, disease, and neglect that bred the conditions where Tuberculosis rapidly spread.
Sources

(E. Matheson, Notice to "Ottawa, January 24, 1902, May 26, 1902, and January 28, 1903," B.S. (RG 10) Vol. 3885, Ottawa, P.A.C.,)

Sub Event
Inadequate Medical Care for Students
Date
1891-00-00

Sexual Abuse in Residential Schools

Summary

Many students experienced sexual abuse at the hands of school faculty, local clergy members, lay persons from the local community, and other students. Some victims of sexual assault in Residential Schools have remained silent about their experiences for multiple reasons, including shame, fear of disbelief, and symptoms of psychological trauma that are harmful to retell to the survivors. However, given the number of survivors who have reported sexual assault, and the extensive research already collected on the conditions of Residential schools, it is inarguable that sexual violence was widespread throughout the institutions, having immediate and long-term effect on Indigenous peoples and their communities. This is affirmed by Mel H. Buffalo, an adviser to the Samson band in Alberta, who says that "every Indian person I have spoken to who attended these schools has a story of mental, physical or sexual abuse.". Several incidents of sexual abuse and neglect occurred under Principle McWhinney at the Crowstand IRS. Following incidents of abuse in 1914, D. C. Scott, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, instructed that female students be sent home. It was deemed the institution was no longer safe to continue mixed education of boys and girls.


 

Result

Sexual violence/abuse was recorded since the beginning of Residential Schools in the late nineteenth century. Abuse was usually ignored or covered up by school and church authorities. Those that were addressed rarely went beyond the perpetrator being told to stop with no further action taken. It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that allegations of sexual exploitation/assault by faculty were treated seriously with a number of investigations, arrests, and convictions. While there has been some institutional response from the federal government and church in more recent years, there continues to be barriers in acquiring support and compensation for many survivors and the long-term impacts of Residential Schooling. One ongoing legal battle the federal government has spent 3.2 million dollars against since 2013 are the survivors of St. Anne’s residential school in Ontario. Survivors have asked for a renegotiation of compensation terms after new information “documenting the serious nature of the sexual and physical abuse rampant at St Anne’s” (Royal Canadian Geographical Society, A Fight For Truth) was released following the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The federal government denies that larger compensation is owed. This demonstrates the continuation of settler colonial violence against survivors and the wavering commitment of the Canadian Government to engage in true reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.  


RG-10 RECORDS AND DOCUMENT SUMMARY

 

RG10, C- 8147, Vol. 6027, File 117-1-1, part 1; Title: Agent Blewett to Secretary, 21 July, 1914.

Regarding the investigation into the hapenning at Crowstand school in March and May of 1914. "From statements, of five of the larger girls, signed by these girls in the presence of witnesses, I find that during March last H. Everett, then farmer at the school, entered the girls dormitory alone on two nights and spent some time in the company of two girls in seperate beds. A few nights after this, Everett, with five boys from the Reserve adjacent, entered the same dormitory and spent about half an hour there, each boy (except one who had no girls) got into bed with one of the girls. The girls deny that any immoral acts were committed, but in the case of three older ones, I doubt the truth if this. In May last, from statements signed by Harriet Papequosh and Clara Fiddler, Everett had these two girls, seperatly in his private room, and locked the doors and had sexual intercourse with them." Regarding principle Mc Whinney being sick at the time of the investigation: "I found out after that he knew of the irregularities and had dismissed Everett, so that before I had definite facts to proceed on, Everett had left this district. I will try to bring him to justice. I would like advice as to what I had better do regarding the Reserve men who were in the school with Everett that night. The girls in question are 14 and 15 years old." Regarding Crowstand school: "The School Building at Crowstand is not at all suitable for good, safe and healthy work and if the Boarding School is to be continued a new school should be built at the earliest possible moment, before more serious things happen.


RG10, C- 8147, Vol. 6027, File 117-1-1, part 1; Title: Agent Blewett to Secretary, August 25, 1914.

 

"After giving the matter careful consideration, Scott concludes that it would not be well to continue the co-education of the sexes in this school any longer. For this reason it has been decided to return the girls to their parents so that their mothers may be in a position to look after them until other suitable arrangements can be made for their education. The school may be kept for the boys exclusively and Mr. McWhinney is being instructed to discharge all the girls and return them to their homes. Scott does not accept the responsibility of condoning McWhinney's treatment of the Everett incident. Scott believes McWhinney is no longer of great use at Crowstand as the Indians have no confidence in his management of the school."


   RG10, C- 8147, Vol. 6027, File 117-1-1, part 1; Title: D.C. Scott to A. Grant, 19 September, 1914.

Regarding the irregularities reported at Crowstand School: "I beg to say that I am pleased to learn, on final hearing in court, from the girls concerned, that the reserve boys were not in the dormitories as formerly reported, but were trying to get in only. As it was on oath we must believe it, although Mr. Bradford and myself thought it the case of all but two there were doubts, however we accepted it and hope it is true. Mr McWhinney has written me stating that Everett confessed to him before he was dismissed, that he had immoral relations with the girls in question, but being unwell at the time and hoping the young man would be benifited by this lesson, he sent him from the school and closed the matter up." In a correspondence dated 19 September, 1914 to Reverend Andrew Grant from the Deputy Superintendent General, it is noted that the girls were eventually sent home from the Crowstand school, and it became a only boys school until further arrangements were made.


 

Sources
  • Baiguzhiyeva, Dariya. “St Anne’s residential school survivors reject Ottawa’s request for independent review.” TIMMINSTODAY.com. March 26, 2021. https://www.timminstoday.com/local-news/st-annes-residential-schoolsurvivorsreject-ottawas-request-for-independent-review-3578450
  • Capitaine, Brieg, and Vanthuyne, Karine, eds. Power through Testimony: Reframing Residential Schools in the Age of Reconciliation. Vancouver: UBC Press,  2017. 321.
  • Milloy, John S. A National Crime: The Canadian Government and the Residential School System, 1879 to 1986. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1999. 144-145.
  • Miller, J. R. Shingwauk's Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools. Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1996. 337-338.
  • Royal Canadian Geographical Society, Issuing Body. “A Fight for Truth.” In, Indigenous Peoples Atlas of Canada = Atlas Des Peuples Autochtones Du Canada. First ed. Aboriginal Education Collection. 2018. https://indigenouspeoplesatlasofcanada.ca/article/a-fight-for-truth/ 

 

 

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Date
1876-00-00
Region
Church

Battleford Industrial School Fails to Meet Enrollment Expectations

Summary

Since the opening of the Battleford Industrial School in 1883, the school struggled to maintain the expected enrollment numbers. After the North-West Resistance in 1885, enrollment dropped even more meaning the school fell well short of the departmental expectations of 30 girls and 30 boys. Principal Clarke had suspicions that someone was advising the parents to not send their children to the school. It was not uncommon to find girls serving as maids in the principal’s house or for a family in town while they were supposed to be in school and any wages they made were appropriated by the school in addition to the child labor already used to supplement the school. The physical and structural damage that the school facilities suffered during the Resistance and a lack of supplies forced Rev. Clarke (the principal) to turn away some applications from parents who wished to enroll their children. Clarke was able to set up a temporary school and continue teaching in a make-shift school located on the western outskirts of town, but he was unable to enroll the sixty students expected by the department. By the late 1880s the relationship between the school and the local Indigenous communities had soured. When the question of Industrial Schools was brought up it was met with 'universal dissatisfaction' by both parents and children. Complaints leveled at the school included keeping children longer than originally agreed upon, the apparent exploitation of the student body, the inability of parents to remove their children from the school, as well as dietary and medical concerns for the students. In addition to these complaints, by 1890, Rev. Clarke, also came under criticism for his managing of the school staff and his administrative responsibilities. These issues resulted in Rev. Clarke being fired from his position as school principle in 1894.

Sub Event
Rev. T. Clarke Fired as Principle
Date
1883-00-00

Dual epidemic of measles & whooping cough

Summary

This epidemic was a combination of measles and whooping cough ranging from the Red River to the Rockies and from the Upper Missouri to Great Slave Lake. Due to similar symptoms and a lack of primary accounts it is difficult to distinguish between the two illnesses. Estimates put the mortality rate between 40 and 65 percent among the Plains Indigenous groups. Fur producers in the northern boreal forest were hit hard by disease in 1819-20.

Implications
Like most epidemics with significant mortality rates, the devastation among Indigenous groups caused a shift in the demographic landscape of the Plains people and was accompanied by famine. A temporary truce was called among the Niitsitapi (Blackfoot), Cree, and Assiniboine because of the spike in mortality. Rumours alleging that the HBC had intentionally caused the infection among the people at Lac la Biche and Lesser Slave Lake caused tensions to be higher between the Plains people and European settlers. As a result of these high mortality rates, Indigenous groups saw a change in their culture. Diminishing numbers meant there were less individuals to carry on the traditions of their people, and many cultural practices and norms began to disappear. The loss of community members to disease meant that communities were left in a position where it became harder to resist European influence because they had less people to unite to remain steadfast in their opposition to European culture and practices.
Date
1819-00-00

Relocation of Indigenous Residents from Uranium City

Summary

The provincial government, not wanting Indigenous residents within the vicinity of Uranium City or working at the nearby mine, relocated Indigenous encampents near or within the developing mining town, and prohibited their settlement within one mile of the town’s limits.


 

Result

According to a report prepared for the Department of Municipal Affairs, A Guide for Development, Uranium City and District., Uranium City housed tent encampents and isolated bush dwellings. These abodes were occupied by approximately 150 First Nations people, as well as 200 to 300 Métis. To further prevent the establishment of Indigenous dwellings in and around Uranium City, planners proposed that a boundary demarcate land 1.5-2 miles beyond the townsite unavailable for 'settlment.' It is noted that the policy was in effect but not rigidly applied.  This likely hindered the economic development and stability of Indigenous residents in the region, while also segregating them away from settler colonists who relocated north for employment. This was both a tactic of economic, social, and political isolation.  


 

Sources
  • Bothwell, R. Eldorado: Canada’s National Uranium Company. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984.
  • Izumi, Arnott. A Guide for Development, Uranium City and District. Regina: Department of Municipal Affairs, Community Planning Branch, 1956.
  • Robert Boschman, and Bill Bunn. "Nuclear Avenue: “Cyclonic Development”, Abandonment, and Relations in Uranium City, Canada." Humanities 7, no. 1 (2018): 5-20.

 

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Date
1953-00-00
Community

Provincial Government Requests Land Surrender on Kitsaki Reserve

Summary

The provincial government requested the surrender of a 139-acre portion of the Kitsaki reserve to expand the town of La Ronge. They stated that the land was unused by members of the band and could be better used to expand the townsite. The inhabitants of the reserve opposed the surrender, and the federal government found people living on that portion of land along with permanent homes, and rejected the request.

Implications
Ultimately, the Kitstaki reserve land was not surrendered.

In the 1870s, the Government of Canada negotiated various treaties with Indigenous peoples of the Prairies. One of the crucial elements promised in these treaties was land that would be reserved for the Indians. And yet, less than a dozen years into the new century, almost a quarter of those valuable reserves that were considered essential to enable Indians to make the transition to an agricultural economy had been surrendered back to the government. Many of the land surrenders that occurred on the Prairies raise arguments regarding the validity of the surrender. Indigenous communities often allege non-compliance with the Indian Act surrender procedures, being pressured to surrender under duress, undue influence on behalf of Indian agents and government officials, unconscionability, lack of informed consent, and breach of fiduciary obligations in the taking of the surrender itself and in the management and administration of the land and the proceeds after the surrender. Over 100 surrenders were obtained on the Prairies between 1896 and 1911, making way for western expansion and an influx of immigrants. Although government officials often argued that Indians had more land than they could use, many of these bands had experienced population loss due to epidemics - a population loss that was in part a product of the government's refusal to provide promised farming implements or food rations. The government played an active part in creating the conditions leading to population loss on reserves, and subsequently took advantage of the situation to gain reserve land from Indian bands. In addition, many of the nations that surrendered their land were in difficult financial situations, and were often indebted to the government. The sale of land was seen as a means to pay back their debts or to purchase much needed food, clothing and farming implements.

Evidence collected through various Indian Claims Commission inquiries suggest the land was often bought from the bands at a cost much lower than what it was resold at. For example, the government would offer the band $1.50/acre, and would then sell it to farmers or land developers for $3.00/acre. The government took advantage of the fact that the bands were in dire need of money and knowingly offered them less than what the land was worth. Most bands had little experience with real estate, land development and speculation, while government officials were well aware of the factors affecting land value and were well connected to the business community. In addition, the notions of private property and land division differed greatly from Indigenous philosophies of communal land use, ownership and responsibility. As with the signing of the numbered Treaties, historians and Indigenous community members have argued that cultural differences and power imbalances allowed for confusion and abuse in the processes of land surrender. As the buffalo populations were dwindling, many Indigenous nations were facing starvation, and entering into treaties was deemed by some leaders to be the best solution to avoid the complete loss of their bands. In this situation, government officials were in a position of power to negotiate treaty terms that were favourable to the Canadian state, although many Indigenous leaders did press the officials for better terms for their bands, and requested additional farming tools, schools and medicine chests. However, the government's failure to abide by the terms of the legally binding treaties was not uncommon; many bands never received promised farming implements / livestock, and food rations. Denied the opportunity and the proper tools to succeed in developing agricultural economies, many bands faced hardship and starvation as they once again negotiated the terms to land surrenders with government officials. As settler interest in western lands increased, the federal government responded with a series of Orders in Council and amendments to the Indian Act which increased the government’s control over reserve affairs and facilitated the surrender of treaty reserves. One such measure occurred in 1911 when an amendment to the Indian Act allowed the government to take reserve land without consent when the reserve was in or near a town of more than 8000 people, or where the land was needed for public purposes (please see database entry entitled: Laurier Government Gives Itself Power to Claim Reserve Land for further information on this subject). Although more research is required regarding this subject, some evidence suggests personal interest of Department officials played a part in generating demand for the surrender of Indian lands. The 1915 Ferguson Commission was appointed by the federal government to investigate Indian Affairs officials who were suspected of conflicts of interest in their dealings with reserve land surrenders. Please see database entry entitled: Ferguson Royal Commission for further information on this subject.

Finally, as aforementioned, Indigenous leaders and historians have pointed to issues pertaining to consent in the context of reserve land surrenders. The Indian Act of 1876 specified that consent for reserve land surrender had to be obtained from the "majority of the male members of the band at the full age of twenty-one years, at a meeting or council thereof summoned for that purpose according to their rules." Although it was clear from the Indian Act that a majority vote was required, there was much debate within government circles as to whether the “majority” referred to in the Act was a majority of only the qualified members attending the surrender meeting or an absolute majority of all eligible members of the band. Consequently, many land surrenders were premised on loosely interpreted consent rules. Evidence gathered through various Indian Claims Commissions suggests government officials employed coercive measures when negotiating reserve land surrenders. On occasion, cash was offered to band members to bribe them into accepting proposed land surrenders. In addition, as some deliberations lasted several days, and votes were taken multiple times, instances occurred where a majority of band members were absent or had left the negotiations, allowing the government to secure a vote in favour of land surrender.

The loss of reserve land had many detrimental consequences for Indigenous communities, who were already faced with traditional land base dispossession as European settlement increased rapidly on the Prairies. Despite the professed goals of the federal government to assist Indigenous people in their transition to agricultural economies, many bands were left with little to no farmable land, as the best fertile land was often part of the surrender. Evidence collected throughout various Indian Claims Commission inquiries also found that several bands failed to receive the payment amounts promised by the government, if any payment at all. The loss of large parcels of land also meant a reduced access to resources and traditional hunting grounds, loss of identity and cultural disconnection. It also signified a loss of self-sufficiency and autonomy. As fertile lands were surrendered, many bands struggled to provide sufficient food for their populations, increasing their dependency on the federal government. Federal economic policies such as an 1881 amendment to the Indian Act prohibiting the sale of agricultural products by Indian bands without the consent of the Indian Agent greatly contributed to the hardship many bands faced. Please see database entry entitled Indian Act Amendment: Regulations of sale of agricultural products for further information on this subject. To conclude, in the past 30 to 40 years, many Indigenous communities on the Prairies have undertaken negotiations with the federal government to obtain compensation, either land, financial or both, as a means to redress government wrongdoings in the cases of reserve land surrenders. The Indian Specific Claims Commission, which has investigated many reserve land surrenders in Canada, was established as a temporary independent advisory body authorized to review specific claims rejected by the government and to issue non-binding decisions.
Date
1950-00-00
Community

North-West/Riel Resistance

Summary

On 7 May Indian Commissioner Edgar Dewdney revealed that several bands had been compelled to join Riel under threat of death. He also revealed that warriors within Indigenous societies supported the conflict. Dewdney did not communicate this information to the Canadian troops deciding instead that the Indians should "have themselves a good lesson before an olive branch is held out to them." He also issued a notice in April stating “This is to give notice that all good and loyal Indians should remain quietly on their Reserves where they will be perfectly safe and receive the protection of the soldiers; and that any Indian being off his Reserve without special permission in writing from authorized person; is liable to be arrested on suspicion of being a rebel, and punished as such. Any loyal Indian who gives such information as will lead to the arrest and conviction of any such runner from Riel, or any hostile bands of Indians, will receive a reward of fifty dollars ($50.00).”

Implications
This decision led to Middleton accusing Aboriginal groups-most notably Poundmaker and Beardy-of their involvement in the resistance. The decision also led to some individuals being arrested, such as Poundmaker.
Sources

NAC, Macdonald Papers, vol. 107, 43071-74, E. Dewdney to J.A. Macdonald, 7 April 1885.

Sub Event
Dewdney Keeps the Nature of Aboriginal Involvement Secret
Date
1885-05-00