Integration & Mobility

Creation of Moose Mountain Reserve

Summary

A temporary reserve was created at Wood Mountain for the Lakota who had fled to Canada from the United States following the Battle of Little Bighorn in 1876. As agricultural settlement began to encroach on unsettled lands, the band saw their freedom to wander and hunt greatly restricted. The obvious solution was a reserve. However, the Lakota did not originate from within the geographical confines of the Canadian settler state (and therefore could not claim land). The government, citing good will and humanitarian concerns, set up a temporary reserve for the band at Wood Mountain. While the reserve (IR 160) was not officially confirmed until 1930, after 1912 it was the permanent home of the only Hunkpapa (Lakota) band in Canada.

Date
1912-00-00
Community

Smallpox impacts tribes along the Saskatchewan River

Summary

In the early 1780's, smallpox had spread to Indigenous groups who were located along the Saskatchewan River.

Implications
The high morality rate of the epidemic resulted in an unprecedented period of territorial and demographic change. The Niitsitapi (Blackfoot) saw their territory expand in the wake of the epidemic, while some tribes were devastated by mortality rates reaching as high as 75%. Along the North Saskatchewan River the Assiniboine were hit particularly hard. Either directly after this epidemic or shortly afterward, within a year or two, the U'Basqui'au, Pegogamaw, Cowinetow, and the Basqui Cree ceased to exist as cultural identities. By the turn of the century the Muskego and Anishinabe migrated to the lower Saskatchewan Valley
Sub Event
High mortality rates resulted in an unprecedented period of territorial and demographic changes
Date
1781-10-20

Treaty 10

Summary

A letter from a Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) official demonstrates that the potential for an adhesion to Treaty 8 or the creation of a new Treaty was being discussed for Aboriginal land owners in Northern Saskatchewan as early as 1883. In this letter, the Aboriginals in the area of Ile-a-la-Crosse and others north of Treaty 6 are recorded as being anxious to enter a treaty agreement. It was recognized by the official writing the 1883 letter that any plans of the government to extend the railway or another public work into the area could be prevented by the area’s Aboriginal inhabitants.------------------------------ A DIA memorandum from January 19th, 1887 demonstrates that the Aboriginals north of the Treaty 6 area were still requesting to enter treaty, and that a number of them were sick and destitute. The tribal groups in this area consisted of the Beaver, Slaves, Yellow Knives, Cariboo Eaters, Dog Ribs, Chippewayans, Cree and Metis. There was a scarcity of food the winter prior in this area due to a lack of wildlife such as rabbit and lynx. Hudson’s Bay Company representatives argued that it was the government’s responsibility to provide for the sick and destitute individuals in this area, since they had purchased the Company’s interest in that region. As such, the government was perceived to be the natural protector. Since the government still didn’t need the land for settlement, railways, or resource exploration in the area, however, they continued to postpone treaty negotiation with the respective individuals. Most of the area of northern Saskatchewan was unsuitable for agriculture, with the exception of the Peace River district. The same memorandum states that occasionally the Aboriginals in the area had been given gifts of fishing supplies and ammunition, but nothing more.------------------------------ By 1904, there was still intra-governmental discussion as to whether the federal government should treat with the Aboriginals in this area or not. A memorandum from 1904 demonstrates this: “The Department has for some time had under consideration the advisability of admitting to Treaty No. 8 the Indians of Portage la Loche and Isle a la Crosse. Not long after this treaty was made, the Department began to be urged to admit these Indians. The half-breed claims within the district were also brought up, but action upon these cognate matters has remained in abeyance until the present.” Discussion centred on the financial burden that would be incurred by the government should they enter into a treaty agreement with the Aboriginal groups in this area. The memoranda remarked as such: “I think we should be careful not to burden the Dominion with any extensive charges for the purchase of the Indian title to this country. We may be reasonably sure that it is not an agricultural country whatever its capacities may be, and that to give a quid pro quo on the same basis as for a country with great agricultural possibilities would be a mistake.” A letter from the Department’s accountant shows that up until May 5th, 1904, all that had been spent on the Aboriginals in the Portage la Loche and Ile-a-la-Crosse areas respectively was $76.52 and $287.12. The maintenance of a boarding school at Ile-a-la-Crosse amounted to an additional expenditure of $72 per year. (The researcher advises that these figures are in dollar amounts from 1904 - no adjustment for inflation has been made.)------------------------------- The 1904 memoranda also noted that in light of the lack of agricultural land available for settlement in the area, it would be more advantageous to the government to model the terms of a potential treaty on the terms that were provided in Treaty 9. Given the familiarity of the Aboriginal people in the area with the penny-pinching terms of treaty 9, however, it is doubtful that they would have considered these terms acceptable, and thus the terms of treaty 8 were used as a guide, albeit edited to omit provisions that related to agricultural assistance.------------------------------ On July 20, 1906, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs Frank Oliver set up the Treaty 10 Commission via an order of the Privy Council. J.A.J. McKenna, the appointed Commissioner for the treaty, was not able to conclude negotiations with all First Nations in the Treaty 10 region in 1906, so Thomas A. Borthwick was employed to finish the job in the summer of 1907. In a report dating to January 18, 1907, the official notes with respect to the actual negotiations that had occurred the summer past that “There was a marked absence of the old Indian style of oratory, the Indians confining themselves to asking questions and making brief arguments. They all demanded even more liberal terms than were granted to Indians treated with in past years, the Chief of the English River Bend going so far as to claim payment of “arrears” from the year when the first Treaty was made; some expected to be entirely fed by the Government, after the making of the treaty; all asked for assistance in seasons of distress; and it was strongly urged that the old and indigent who were no longer able to hunt and trap and were consequently often in destitute circumstances should be cared for by the Government.”------------------------------ Because the government required McKenna to work with a pre-drafted Treaty that could not be altered despite Aboriginal discontent, there was an expressed fear on the part of the Aboriginal leaders that entering into treaty would curtail their hunting and fishing privileges. These leaders did not want lakes or rivers to be monopolized or depleted by commercial fishing operations. There was an additional fear that entering into treaty would allow the government to enslave them, in regards to which the report states “I was able to disabuse their minds of this absurd notion and to make it clear that the Government’s object was simply to do for them what had been done for neighbouring Indians when the progress of trade or settlement began to interfere with the untrammelled exercise of their aboriginal privileges as hunters...I made it clear that the Government had no desire to interfere with their mode of life or to restrict them to reserves and that it undertook to have land in the proportions stated in the Treaty set apart for them…” The report also notes that there was a marked desire to secure education rights for their children, as well as the furnishing of medicines and a resident medical man. He also remarked that there were some Aboriginal people who demanded a few head of cattle for those who wanted to raise stock. ------------------------------ Because the government had informed the Commissioner that the terms of the treaty were fixed and that no negotiations would occur, the official attempted to assuage the fears of the Aboriginal leaders with reassurances such as the following: “I stated that the Government was always ready to assist Indians in actual destitution; that in times of distress they would without any special stipulation in the treaty, receive such assistance as it was usual to give in order to prevent starvation among them, and that the attention of the Government would be called to the necessity of some special-provision being made for assisting the old and indigent who were unable to work and dependent on charity for subsistence.”------------------------------

Implications
The reluctance of the government to enter into treaty and adopt the financial obligations associated with said legal obligations is indicative of a shift in its relationship toward and perception of Indigenous people. Whereas the British North America Act had symbolized the Crown as the protector of Indigenous interests on a nation-to-nation basis, it became clear in years following that this protection was extremely limited and only enacted to the extent that it enabled a protection of Crown interests. As such, the Queen’s representatives in Canada expressed little intent to come to the aid of the Aboriginal peoples who inhabited northern Saskatchewan during their times of sickness and destitution in 1887. Any gifts that had been given to these Aboriginal groups likely served the purpose of placation and maintenance of pseudo-friendly relations with non-Indigenous people in the area. The government’s preoccupation with discussion of the potential financial burden that would be incurred by entering into treaty is evidence of a lack of concern regarding Indigenous interests and well-being both in the short and long-term. Further evidence of this utilitarian ethic is demonstrated by the government’s deliberation as to whether they could negotiate using the penny-pinching terms set forward by Treaty 9. As well, it should be noted that following establishment of the legal agreement of Treaty 10, the government reneged on several of its promises, most notably those of healthcare and aid. Commissioner Borthwick, acting on the instructions of Minister Oliver, had assured the Aboriginal leaders that the government would doubtlessly provide terms of healthcare and aid, and that these need not be included in the treaty. In the years following, however, the government resorted to a familiar legal defense by asserting that these terms had not been included in the official “legal” written document, and as such, no obligation to provide aid or health care existed. This demonstrates an indifference on the part of the Crown in regards to how its encouragement of encroaching Settlers and commercial fishing and hunting operations were making it increasingly difficult for Aboriginal peoples to survive via a subsistence living. Additionally, the following decades presented other problems in receiving the goods and services to which the Crown had agreed in the treaty negotiations.
Sub Event
Île-à-la-Crosse, Lac du Brochet, Canoe Lake
Date
1906-08-28

Petition to Canadian Government from Treaty 5 Area

Summary

On June 25, 1874 Chief Rundle and several other Indigenous leaders from the Treaty 5 area petitioned Alexander Morris—Governor of the North-West Territories for a treaty agreement. The petitioners used two main arguments to justify the need for treaty. First of, the population density was exceeding the territory's capacity to provide the necessities of life. Second, changes in the fur trade transportation system, such as the deployment of steamboats, meant many men faced unemployment and that their families would suffer as a consequence. Seasonal labour associated with the fur trade had long been a source of employment and income for the local economy. They argued that the hunting economy was in need of assistance, and sought to relocate to lands that were suitable for farming. A treaty with the government offered a potential remedy for their declining economic circumstances. The three Saskatchewan First Nations included in Treaty 5 are Cumberland House First Nation, Red Earth First Nation and Shoal Lake First Nation. The Manitoba community of Norway House which faced starvation at the time of treaty, sought to relocate to an area north of Lake Winnipeg where lands were more suitable for agriculture.

 

Result

By November 1874 the petitioners had not received a response, a treaty was only negotiated when it was beneficial for the Canadian Government. Citing the “Queen’s benevolence” Morris negotiated Treaty 5 in 1875, but as J.R. Miller outlines there were economic imperatives that likely led the Canadian government to negotiate Treaty 5. Although the region had limited agricultural potential, Indian title needed to be extinguished to allow the free travel of steamships along the Saskatchewan River. The opening up of this waterway would provide new methods of transportation that would allow for the rapid shipment of goods to and from the fertile prairies

Since the lands surrounding Lake Winnipeg were not considered as fertile as the Plains, the commissioners did not offer the same treaty terms as those negotiated in Treaties 3 and 4. For example, the peoples of Treaty 5 were to receive a one-time payment of $5 upon signing the treaty, instead of the $12 given to the peoples of Treaties 3 and 4. In addition, Treaty 5 peoples would only receive 160 acres of land per family, which is one-quarter of the land granted to the peoples of Treaties 3 and 4 (although it is the same amount offered to the peoples of Treaties 1 and 2). The rest of the terms and conditions of Treaty 5 were similar to the previously negotiated Numbered Treaties. As a result, there was little room for negotiation on the part of the Indigenous peoples.

 

Sources

PAM, MG12 B1, Morris Papers, reel 2, no. 783. Petition, Rossville, 25 June 1874. PAM, MG12 B2, Morris Papers, reel 5, no. 258, Morris to the Minister of the Interior 21 May 1875.

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Date
1874-00-00

Fishing Lake Land Surrender

Summary

13,170 acres (approximately half of the reserve land) of Fishing Lake reserve was surrendered on the northern part of the reserve, along the Canadian Northern Railway for the establishment of a townsite and station grounds. As a result, the Fishing Lake band lost more than half of their reserve land and became part of the Pelly Agency. There are no documents relating to the administration of the band in regards to this land surrender, and Martin-McGuire suggests that the demand for the land may have come entirely from CNOR.

Implications
In the 1870s, the Government of Canada negotiated various treaties with Indigenous peoples of the Prairies. One of the crucial elements promised in these treaties was land that would be reserved for the Indians. And yet, less than a dozen years into the new century, almost a quarter of those valuable reserves that were considered essential to enable Indians to make the transition to an agricultural economy had been surrendered back to the government. Many of the land surrenders that occurred on the Prairies raise arguments regarding the validity of the surrender. Indigenous communities often allege non-compliance with the Indian Act surrender procedures, being pressured to surrender under duress, undue influence on behalf of Indian agents and government officials, unconscionability, lack of informed consent, and breach of fiduciary obligations in the taking of the surrender itself and in the management and administration of the land and the proceeds after the surrender. Over 100 surrenders were obtained on the Prairies between 1896 and 1911, making way for western expansion and an influx of immigrants. Although government officials often argued that Indians had more land than they could use, many of these bands had experienced population loss due to epidemics - a population loss that was in part a product of the government's refusal to provide promised farming implements or food rations. The government played an active part in creating the conditions leading to population loss on reserves, and subsequently took advantage of the situation to gain reserve land from Indian bands. In addition, many of the nations that surrendered their land were in difficult financial situations, and were often indebted to the government. The sale of land was seen as a means to pay back their debts or to purchase much needed food, clothing and farming implements.----------------Evidence collected through various Indian Claims Commission inquiries suggest the land was often bought from the bands at a cost much lower than what it was resold at. For example, the government would offer the band $1.50/acre, and would then sell it to farmers or land developers for $3.00/acre. The government took advantage of the fact that the bands were in dire need of money and knowingly offered them less than what the land was worth. Most bands had little experience with real estate, land development and speculation, while government officials were well aware of the factors affecting land value and were well connected to the business community. In addition, the notions of private property and land division differed greatly from Indigenous philosophies of communal land use, ownership and responsibility. As with the signing of the numbered Treaties, historians and Indigenous community members have argued that cultural differences and power imbalances allowed for confusion and abuse in the processes of land surrender. As the buffalo populations were dwindling, many Indigenous nations were facing starvation, and entering into treaties was deemed by some leaders to be the best solution to avoid the complete loss of their bands. In this situation, government officials were in a position of power to negotiate treaty terms that were favourable to the Canadian state, although many Indigenous leaders did press the officials for better terms for their bands, and requested additional farming tools, schools and medicine chests. However, the government's failure to abide by the terms of the legally binding treaties was not uncommon; many bands never received promised farming implements / livestock, and food rations. Denied the opportunity and the proper tools to succeed in developing agricultural economies, many bands faced hardship and starvation as they once again negotiated the terms to land surrenders with government officials. As settler interest in western lands increased, the federal government responded with a series of Orders in Council and amendments to the Indian Act which increased the government’s control over reserve affairs and facilitated the surrender of treaty reserves. One such measure occurred in 1911 when an amendment to the Indian Act allowed the government to take reserve land without consent when the reserve was in or near a town of more than 8000 people, or where the land was needed for public purposes (please see database entry entitled: Laurier Government Gives Itself Power to Claim Reserve Land for further information on this subject). Although more research is required regarding this subject, some evidence suggests personal interest of Department officials played a part in generating demand for the surrender of Indian lands. The 1915 Ferguson Commission was appointed by the federal government to investigate Indian Affairs officials who were suspected of conflicts of interest in their dealings with reserve land surrenders. Please see database entry entitled: Ferguson Royal Commission for further information on this subject.-------------------------Finally, as aforementioned, Indigenous leaders and historians have pointed to issues pertaining to consent in the context of reserve land surrenders. The Indian Act of 1876 specified that consent for reserve land surrender had to be obtained from the "majority of the male members of the band at the full age of twenty-one years, at a meeting or council thereof summoned for that purpose according to their rules." Although it was clear from the Indian Act that a majority vote was required, there was much debate within government circles as to whether the “majority” referred to in the Act was a majority of only the qualified members attending the surrender meeting or an absolute majority of all eligible members of the band. Consequently, many land surrenders were premised on loosely interpreted consent rules. Evidence gathered through various Indian Claims Commissions suggests government officials employed coercive measures when negotiating reserve land surrenders. On occasion, cash was offered to band members to bribe them into accepting proposed land surrenders. In addition, as some deliberations lasted several days, and votes were taken multiple times, instances occurred where a majority of band members were absent or had left the negotiations, allowing the government to secure a vote in favour of land surrender. -------------------------The loss of reserve land had many detrimental consequences for Indigenous communities, who were already faced with traditional land base dispossession as European settlement increased rapidly on the Prairies. Despite the professed goals of the federal government to assist Indigenous people in their transition to agricultural economies, many bands were left with little to no farmable land, as the best fertile land was often part of the surrender. Evidence collected throughout various Indian Claims Commission inquiries also found that several bands failed to receive the payment amounts promised by the government, if any payment at all. The loss of large parcels of land also meant a reduced access to resources and traditional hunting grounds, loss of identity and cultural disconnection. It also signified a loss of self-sufficiency and autonomy. As fertile lands were surrendered, many bands struggled to provide sufficient food for their populations, increasing their dependency on the federal government. Federal economic policies such as an 1881 amendment to the Indian Act prohibiting the sale of agricultural products by Indian bands without the consent of the Indian Agent greatly contributed to the hardship many bands faced. Please see database entry entitled Indian Act Amendment: Regulations of sale of agricultural products for further information on this subject. To conclude, in the past 30 to 40 years, many Indigenous communities on the Prairies have undertaken negotiations with the federal government to obtain compensation, either land, financial or both, as a means to redress government wrongdoings in the cases of reserve land surrenders. The Indian Specific Claims Commission, which has investigated many reserve land surrenders in Canada, was established as a temporary independent advisory body authorized to review specific claims rejected by the government and to issue non-binding decisions.
Sources

NA, RG 10, vol. 4020, file 280470/2, letter from Oliver to Pedley, August 14, 1905 PARC, file 675/31-2-17-89, CNOR vol. 1, Carruthers to McLean, December 15, 1905

Date
1907-00-00

Coté Land Surrenders

Summary

In 1904, the Cot. band surrendered 272 acres for the creation of a townsite and 30.06 acres for station grounds along the Canadian Northern Railway. This was only the first of many land surrenders on the Coté reserve that would significantly reduce the band's land base in the 1900s. In 1905, 18,043 acres of the eastern part of the Coté reserve was surrendered to feed the growing townsite of Kamsack. In exchange for the 18,043 acres surrendered, the band was granted approximately 6000 acres of hayland, which officials deemed more necessary for the band. Officials decided that the band would make better use of haylands, and settlers would make better use of the surrendered reserve lands. The band was also granted significantly less land than they surrendered, which suggests the deal was one-sided.

In 1907, Indian Affairs requested that the 1905 land surrender be nullified, and a new land surrender take place as the originally surrendered land was of poor quality and did not attract settlers. The new land surrender (10,740 acres) also created a boundary between the reserve and the town of Kamsack.

Result

The new surrender returned the non-ideal farmland to the band, and removed a section of the reserve closest to Kamsack, which limited the band's access to the townsite. This event demonstrates that settlers were given priority as it related to quality of farmland, despite the professed goals of the federal government to assist Indigenous people with a transition to an agricultural livelihood. It should also be noted that this transition was a legal obligation - included in the numbered treaties.

In the 1870s, the Government of Canada negotiated various treaties with Indigenous peoples of the Prairies. One of the crucial elements promised in these treaties was land that would be reserved for the Indians. And yet, less than a dozen years into the new century, almost a quarter of those valuable reserves that were considered essential to enable Indians to make the transition to an agricultural economy had been surrendered back to the government. Many of the land surrenders that occurred on the Prairies raise arguments regarding the validity of the surrender. Indigenous communities often allege non-compliance with the Indian Act surrender procedures, being pressured to surrender under duress, undue influence on behalf of Indian agents and government officials, unconscionability, lack of informed consent, and breach of fiduciary obligations in the taking of the surrender itself and in the management and administration of the land and the proceeds after the surrender. Over 100 surrenders were obtained on the Prairies between 1896 and 1911, making way for western expansion and an influx of immigrants. Although government officials often argued that Indians had more land than they could use, many of these bands had experienced population loss due to epidemics - a population loss that was in part a product of the government's refusal to provide promised farming implements or food rations. The government played an active part in creating the conditions leading to population loss on reserves, and subsequently took advantage of the situation to gain reserve land from Indian bands. In addition, many of the nations that surrendered their land were in difficult financial situations, and were often indebted to the government. The sale of land was seen as a means to pay back their debts or to purchase much needed food, clothing and farming implements

Evidence collected through various Indian Claims Commission inquiries suggest the land was often bought from the bands at a cost much lower than what it was resold at. For example, the government would offer the band $1.50/acre, and would then sell it to farmers or land developers for $3.00/acre. The government took advantage of the fact that the bands were in dire need of money and knowingly offered them less than what the land was worth. Most bands had little experience with real estate, land development and speculation, while government officials were well aware of the factors affecting land value and were well connected to the business community. In addition, the notions of private property and land division differed greatly from Indigenous philosophies of communal land use, ownership and responsibility. As with the signing of the numbered Treaties, historians and Indigenous community members have argued that cultural differences and power imbalances allowed for confusion and abuse in the processes of land surrender. As the buffalo populations were dwindling, many Indigenous nations were facing starvation, and entering into treaties was deemed by some leaders to be the best solution to avoid the complete loss of their bands. In this situation, government officials were in a position of power to negotiate treaty terms that were favourable to the Canadian state, although many Indigenous leaders did press the officials for better terms for their bands, and requested additional farming tools, schools and medicine chests. However, the government's failure to abide by the terms of the legally binding treaties was not uncommon; many bands never received promised farming implements / livestock, and food rations. Denied the opportunity and the proper tools to succeed in developing agricultural economies, many bands faced hardship and starvation as they once again negotiated the terms to land surrenders with government officials. As settler interest in western lands increased, the federal government responded with a series of Orders in Council and amendments to the Indian Act which increased the government’s control over reserve affairs and facilitated the surrender of treaty reserves. One such measure occurred in 1911 when an amendment to the Indian Act allowed the government to take reserve land without consent when the reserve was in or near a town of more than 8000 people, or where the land was needed for public purposes (please see database entry entitled: Laurier Government Gives Itself Power to Claim Reserve Land for further information on this subject). Although more research is required regarding this subject, some evidence suggests personal interest of Department officials played a part in generating demand for the surrender of Indian lands. The 1915 Ferguson Commission was appointed by the federal government to investigate Indian Affairs officials who were suspected of conflicts of interest in their dealings with reserve land surrenders. Please see database entry entitled: Ferguson Royal Commission for further information on this subject

Finally, as aforementioned, Indigenous leaders and historians have pointed to issues pertaining to consent in the context of reserve land surrenders. The Indian Act of 1876 specified that consent for reserve land surrender had to be obtained from the "majority of the male members of the band at the full age of twenty-one years, at a meeting or council thereof summoned for that purpose according to their rules." Although it was clear from the Indian Act that a majority vote was required, there was much debate within government circles as to whether the “majority” referred to in the Act was a majority of only the qualified members attending the surrender meeting or an absolute majority of all eligible members of the band. Consequently, many land surrenders were premised on loosely interpreted consent rules. Evidence gathered through various Indian Claims Commissions suggests government officials employed coercive measures when negotiating reserve land surrenders. On occasion, cash was offered to band members to bribe them into accepting proposed land surrenders. In addition, as some deliberations lasted several days, and votes were taken multiple times, instances occurred where a majority of band members were absent or had left the negotiations, allowing the government to secure a vote in favour of land surrender.

The loss of reserve land had many detrimental consequences for Indigenous communities, who were already faced with traditional land base dispossession as European settlement increased rapidly on the Prairies. Despite the professed goals of the federal government to assist Indigenous people in their transition to agricultural economies, many bands were left with little to no farmable land, as the best fertile land was often part of the surrender. Evidence collected throughout various Indian Claims Commission inquiries also found that several bands failed to receive the payment amounts promised by the government, if any payment at all. The loss of large parcels of land also meant a reduced access to resources and traditional hunting grounds, loss of identity and cultural disconnection. It also signified a loss of self-sufficiency and autonomy. As fertile lands were surrendered, many bands struggled to provide sufficient food for their populations, increasing their dependency on the federal government. Federal economic policies such as an 1881 amendment to the Indian Act prohibiting the sale of agricultural products by Indian bands without the consent of the Indian Agent greatly contributed to the hardship many bands faced. Please see database entry entitled Indian Act Amendment: Regulations of sale of agricultural products for further information on this subject. To conclude, in the past 30 to 40 years, many Indigenous communities on the Prairies have undertaken negotiations with the federal government to obtain compensation, either land, financial or both, as a means to redress government wrongdoings in the cases of reserve land surrenders. The Indian Specific Claims Commission, which has investigated many reserve land surrenders in Canada, was established as a temporary independent advisory body authorized to review specific claims rejected by the government and to issue non-binding decisions.    

Sources

NA, RG 10,vol. 4011, file 260260-1, Report of July 19, 1905; NA, RG 10, vol. 4011, file 260260-2

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Date
1904-07-00

Broadview Petition for Crooked Lakes Land Sale

Summary

Some 200 citizens of Broadview sent a petition to Ottawa to open up the sale of a three-mile stretch of land in the Crooked Lakes reserve, claiming it was impeding the growth of the town. This petition followed one penned in 1891 by Broadview residents urging the government to open reserve land for settlement.

Implications
Euro-Canadian citizens internalized colonial narratives perpetuated by the government and media as it related to the rights of non-Indigenous people to occupy the lands of "uncivilized" or "barbaric" peoples. One underlying tenet of this Western philosophy of non-Indigenous expansion, domination and control was the Lockean belief that land must be "productive", that is, properly cultivated in a European agricultural manner. As well, such land must be commoditized and subdivided into plots of ownership that could be individually owned, allowing for participation in the capitalist, cash-based economy as the value of the land was leveraged through mortgaging and/or the fruits of agricultural labor sold for a profit. Those who did not participate in Western systems of capitalistic commoditization were deemed "uncivilized," thus necessitating their assimilation through oppressive government policy and sequestration on small reserves.
Sources

RG 10, vol. 3732, file 26,623, Petition from the Residents of Broadview and Whitewood,1902; J.D McLean to Rev. J.G Stephens, 2 April 1902.

Date
1902-00-00

Qu'Appelle Agency Created

Summary

In an attempt to cut down on spending, Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton amalgamated the File Hills and Muscowpetung Agencies, creating the Qu’Appelle Agency. William Morris Graham was put at the head of this agency, having been the agent of the File Hills agency previously.

Implications
As a result of this decision, more power was consolidated into the hands of William Graham Morris. As well, the financial and bureaucratic resources available to these two agencies were reduced, demonstrating the government's desire to reduce their spending on the "Indian problem" overall. This would affect their ability to meet treaty obligations such as providing farm equipment, food rations, education and medical care.
Sources

PAC, RG 10, vol. 3878, file 91, 839-7

Sub Event
Amalgamation of File Hills and Muscowpetung Agencies
Date
1901-00-00

Pheasant Rump and Ocean Man Amalgamation to White Bear

Summary

First reserve land surrender in Saskatchewan. Clifford Sifton forced Pheasant Rump and Ocean Man First Nations to surrender their entire land base (46,720 acres) and move onto White Bear’s reserve. It is suggested from an interpreter’s records that Indian Affairs superintendent James A. Smart may have threatened the band with forcible removal if they did not agree to the terms of surrender. The land was sold for a price of $1.23 an acre, while nearby non-reserve lands were being sold for approximately $3 an acre.

Implications
The band received less than market value for their land, suggesting that finding a non-Indigenous buyer was more important than ensuring that Indigenous people received a fair price. Thus, after having been threatened with forcible removal, the band's inability to enforce a sale price at par with market value resulted in their economic exploitation. Several sociocultural problems arose because of this amalgamation, which resulted in the combination of four distinct Indigenous nations (Saulteaux, Cree, Nakota, Dakota) being restricted to one reserve. In the 1970s Ocean Man descendants were part of a land claim launched against the federal government that eventually saw the successful re-establishment of both the band (1988) and their reserve (1992).
Sources

Laird to the minister of the interior, 10 August 1877, LAC RG 10, vol. 3650, file 8347.

Sub Event
Pheasant Rump and Ocean Man Land Surrenders
Date
1901-00-00

Plan to Eliminate File Hills Agency

Summary

Hayter Reed noted in a communication with Vankoughnet that he intended to dissolve the File Hills agency, combining its remaining reserve population with the Crooked Lakes, Muscowpetung, Touchwood, and Pelly agencies.

Implications
It was Reed's intention that by dissolving the File Hills agency and reintegrating its members into other agencies, there would be less political power in the hands of members. This move would also open up more land for Euro-Canadian settlement and reduce the financial burden on Indian Affairs.
Sources

Reed to Vankoughnet, November 1889 [NA, Reed Papers, vol. 21, large letterbook file, no.94]

Date
1889-11-00